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THE PHILONIC GOD OF REVELATION AND HIS LATTER-DAY DENIERS

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I

PHILO, professionally, was not a teacher of philosophy. He was a preacher, a preacher on biblical topics, who dispensed his philosophic thoughts in the form of sermons. And because he was not professionally a teacher of philosophy, some modern students of his works say that he was not a philosopher. For nowadays, as we all know, to be called philosopher one must be ordained and one must be hired to teach philosophy and one must also learn to discuss certain hoary problems as if they were plucked yesterday out of the air. Some say that Philo was an eclectic. But there is one eminent authority who would begrudge him even the title of eclectic without further qualification, for, after all, eclecticism is the name of a reputable system in ancient Greek philosophy. The eclecticism of Philo, our eminent authority says, "is that of the jackdaw rather than the philosopher."[1] But, while we may deny Philo the honorific title of philosopher, with the privilege of wearing ostentatiously a special garb like that affected by ancient Greek philosophers, we cannot deny him the humbler and more modest title of religious philosopher. As such, Philo was the first who tried to reduce the narratives and laws and exhortations of Scripture to a coherent and closely knit system of thought and thereby produced what may be called scriptural philosophy in contradistinction to pagan Greek philosophy.

Let us then analyze this scriptural philosophy of Philo into its essential elements, so that we may afterwards see how these essential elements of the Philonic scriptural philosophy were treated in modern philosophy since the seventeenth century.

The starting point of Philo's philosophy is an enumeration and

[1] E. R. Dodds, "The Parmenides of Plato and the Origin of the Neoplatonic 'One'," The Classical Quarterly 22 (1928), p. 132, n. 1.

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assessment of the various views with regard to the ways by which men have arrived, or may arrive, at a knowledge of God. He enumerates three views.

According to some, he says, the way by which men have arrived at a knowledge of God is the way of imagination. The belief in God, according to them, is a fictitious belief, the product of our imagination, like the belief in chimeras and centaurs and hydras. As restated by Philo, the belief in God, according to this view, was invented by some clever legislator in order to tame the rebellious spirit of the people and inspire them with awe and fear and reverence for the law. Philo does not give us the name of the author of this view. But he can be identified as Critias, the leader of the Thirty Tyrants in Athens at the beginning of the fifth century before the Christian era. His view, which may be summarized in the maxim that religion is the bugaboo of the people, has been revived in our own time in the maxim, so well familiar to all of us, that religion is the opiate of the people. In principle, if not in purpose, this view, insofar as it makes God a mere concept in our mind, may also be considered as the forerunner of the various forms of modern religious humanism, which identifies God with man's idealized consciousness or with human aspirations for ideal values or with the unity of all ideal ends which arouse men to desire and actions.

Philo dismisses this view as atheism.[2]

According to others, says Philo, God is the discovery of human reason. God is not a figment of our imagination. He has real existence outside our mind, and we are able to discover Him by the power of our mind. It is the God whom Plato discovered when, starting with a world which he held to have been framed out of an eternal formless matter, he was compelled by reason to assume the existence of a Demiurge or a God who has framed the world. It is also the God whom Aristotle discovered when, starting with an eternal world which is eternally in motion, he was compelled by reason to arrive at the existence of a being who is an immovable mover. It is also the God of the Stoics who, starting with a world in which they saw order and beauty and purpose, found themselves compelled by reason to arrive at the ex-

[2] Cf. my Philo, I, pp. 165–167.

istence of a God, whom they call, among other things, the mind or the soul of the world. In principle, if not in wording, this view is the forerunner of all modern forms of religious rationalism, whether its God is called substance, or central monad, or spirit, or cosmic consciousness, or élan vital, or universal nisus, or principle of concretion, or ground of being.

Philo does not deny that one may arrive by reason at some knowledge of God. In his characterization of Greek philosophers, he distinguishes between those who were believers of God and those who were deniers of God; and Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics are placed by him among the former. Still he does not believe that reason is the only way of arriving at a knowledge of God; nor does he believe that reason alone can lead us to a true and full knowledge of God. There is to him a third way of arriving at a knowledge of God, the way of revelation.

As conceived by Philo, revelation meant two things.

First, it meant the historical revelation: an event which took place in the past when at Mount Sinai God made himself known to men and gave them the Law. Indeed Philo refers to certain people in his own city who denied the divine and revealed origin of Scripture. He describes them as a sort of amateur students of comparative religions, whose only tool of reasoning was that of analogy and, whenever they observed among various peoples beliefs and customs which were alike in some respects, they inferred that they must be alike in every respect. And so, because they found in Greek mythology stories about appearances of gods to men and the revelation of laws, stories which they themselves considered as false, they argued that the account of the appearance of God at Mount Sinai and the revelation of His Law there is similarly false. Philo does not argue against them; he simply dismisses them as "impious" [3] and asserts his faith in revelation. For revelation to him is a matter of faith and not of reason, though occasionally he tries to confirm his faith in revelation by such arguments as the intrinsic excellency of its teachings and the salutary effects of these teachings upon those who follow them.[4]

[3] De Confusione Linguarum 2, 2.
[4] Cf. my Philosophy of the Church Fathers, I, p. 19.

Scripture, despite its similarities to other books, is to him a unique book. All other books are man-made, and their stories and teachings may be either true or false. Scripture is of divine origin, and its stories and teachings are all true. As a philosopher who tried to introduce logical coherence in his religious beliefs, he tries to remove the apparent inconsistency between a God who was declared to be invisible and the story of His having made himself visible to men at Mount Sinai. In great detail he tells us how the revelation at Mount Sinai was not a physical appearance of God, how the "words" in which God "spoke" with His "voice" were not physical words, uttered, as he says, by means of "mouth and tongue and windpipe." [5] But still, while all this was a miraculous event and one unlike ordinary human communication, the event still had taken place actually as a historical fact, and is not to be explained away as a fancy or dismissed as a fiction.

Second, revelation meant to him progressive revelation, a continuous revealment of God to chosen individual human beings to make known to them the meaning of the revealed Law. For though he believed that the revelation was final and perfect, inasmuch as the Law was to be eternal, this belief did not mean to him that it was a closed revelation. Final and perfect indeed it was, but as a revelation to men, it had to be couched in ordinary language, in language intelligible to the ordinary run of man, and so the perfection of its teaching was often obscured by the imperfection of human language. Those to whom the Law was revealed, and who were to live by it and to believe it were to search for those inner meanings hidden behind the uttered words. This search for the inner meaning of Scripture cannot be successfully pursued without the aid of God. It is this divine aid in the discovery of the inner meaning of Scripture that constitutes a new kind of revelation, a progressive revelation, and a revelation which comes in response to the search of human reason. For while Philo, like the rabbis of Palestinian Judaism, believed in the cessation of prophecy with the close of the Hebrew Scripture, it is only that special kind of prophecy which inspired the writings

[5] De Decalogo 9, 32 f.

of the prophets of the Hebrew Scripture that ceased.[6] Divine inspiration and the work of the Holy Spirit continue to function as a supernatural source of human knowledge, by which man is to discover not new truths but the real meaning of the old truths which are embedded in that final historical revelation.

II

Revelation to Philo is not only a new way of coming to a knowledge of God, it also yields a truer conception of God; and hereupon in various places scattered throughout his homilies he explains what the conception of God is as taught by revelation and how that conception of God differs from that taught by reason in the works of the philosophers.

This scriptural conception of God as contrasted with that of Greek philosophers is presented by Philo under three headings, which may be subsumed as a contrast between the conception of God as infinite and the conception of God as finite.

First, God is infinite in the sense that He is incomprehensible, for, that which is infinite, according to a current philosophic maxim, cannot be comprehended by the mind.[7] At the very beginning of his speculation about God Philo declares that in His essence God cannot be known. All that can be known of Him is the fact of His existence. This distinction between the knowability of God's existence and the unknowability of His essence was something new in Greek philosophy. It was introduced by Philo. Among the Church Fathers, about two centuries after Philo, and already under the influence of Philo's teaching of the incomprehensibility of God, the question arose as to whether Plato conceived of God as incomprehensible in His essence.[8] On independent grounds, however, it can be shown that the God of Plato, who was either one of the ideas or a being other than the ideas, could be known in His essence and could be described, though Plato was not unaware of certain logical difficulties arising from his view. Nor was the God of Aristotle unknowable in His

[6] Cf. Philo, II, pp. 52 f.
[7] Phys. I, 4, 187b, 7; Metaph. II, 2, 994b, 27–30.
[8] Cf. Philo, II, pp. 112–113.

essence.[9] The terms ineffable (ἄρρητος), unnamable (ἀκατονόμαστος), and incomprehensible (ἀκατάληπτος), by which the unknowability of God is expressed by Philo, do not occur as a description of God in extant Greek philosophic literature before Philo, but once these terms were used by Philo they begin to occur frequently in Greek philosophy. The chief source of Philo's view of the incomprehensibility of God was his rigid philosophical interpretation of the scriptural prohibition of the likening of God to anything that is in heaven above, or on earth beneath, or in the water under the earth. The unlikeness of God became with him the uniqueness of God. Uniqueness meant that God belonged to no class. And since He belonged to no class, no concept of Him could be formed. He was thus incomprehensible.[10]

Second, God is infinite in the sense of infinite goodness.

As used by Philo, the infinite goodness of God means two things: (a) that God acts freely by will and design and purpose; (b) that God exercises His individual providence over human beings. This conception of the infinite goodness of God, with all its implications, is advanced by Philo as a view in opposition to the views held by various Greek philosophers. Indeed he knew that all Greek philosophers described God as good, and some of them, Plato and the Stoics, though not Aristotle, ascribe to God also providence. But the goodness which they apply to God is not used by them in its ordinary sense as a description of an act performed by will and design and for a purpose. It is applied by them to God in a figurative sense and only because the unwavering, uniform action flowing by necessity from the nature of God has the appearance of an action guided by some intelligent will toward a goal. This is the sense in which not only Aristotle and the Stoics apply goodness to God; it is the sense in which also Plato applies it to God. When Plato, in answer to the question "Why God made this world," says that it is because "He was good" and "desired that all things should be as like unto himself as possible," or that "He desired that all things should be good," [11] despite his use of the term desire there was no choice on the part

[9] Cf. my paper "The Knowability and Describability of God in Plato and Aristotle," Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, 56–57 (1945–46), pp. 233–249.

[10] Cf. Philo, II, pp. 94 ff.

[11] Timaeus 29 D-E.

of God in the creation of this form of the world. He could not create any other kind of world. There were "fated laws" (*νόμοι εἱμαρμένοι*), as he says later,[12] by which the Demiurge was guided in his act of creation.

Similarly the term providence used by them means inexorable, fated laws. As the Church Fathers, a century after Philo and speaking under the influence of Philo, try to show, the providence of the Greek philosophers means universal providence; not individual providence.[13] Against the Stoic saying, which in fact represents the view of the generality of Greek philosophers, that "the gods attend to great matters, but they neglect the small ones," [14] Philo says that God has "a providential regard not only for those which are of greater importance, but also for those which appear to be of less importance." [15]

Philo was not unaware of the many difficulties that may arise from applying to God the attribute of goodness. He was especially aware of the difficulty arising from the problem of evil, both physical and moral evil. He discusses this problem in great detail, both in terms of Scripture and in terms of philosophy.[16] Every answer given in native Jewish tradition and in philosophy is made use of by him. But despite all the answers, a residuum of the problem still remains, and this residuum of the problem is solved by him by the principle of the incomprehensibility of God. Not only do we not know the essence of God; we do not also know the ways of God and the purpose of God. "God," he says, "judges by standards more accurate than any which the human mind employs," [17] which is only a paraphrase of the words of Zophar the Naamathite in the Book of Job, with regard to the problem of evil, that one is not to try to find out the deep things of God or to try to attain unto the purpose of the Almighty (Job 11:7).

Third, God is infinite in the sense of infinite power or omnipotence.

[12] Ibid. 41 A.

[13] Cf. Justin Martyr, Dialogus cum Tryphone 1.

[14] Apud Cicero, De Natura Deorum II, 66, 167; cf. III, 35, 86; Plutarch, De Stoicorum Repugnantiis 37, 2.

[15] De Migratione Abrahami 33, 186.

[16] Cf. Philo, II, pp. 279–303.

[17] De Providentia 2, 54. Cf. Philo, II, p. 291, n. 49.

By omnipotence Philo means four things: (a) God created the world out of nothing and implanted in it certain laws of nature by which it is governed.[18] (b) Before the creation of this world of ours, God, if He willed, could not have created it at all or could have created another kind of world governed by another kind of law.[19] (c) In this present world of ours, God can override the laws which He Himself has implanted in the world and create what is called miracles.[20] (d) God, if He wills, can destroy this world and create in its stead a new heaven and a new earth, though Philo happens to be certain that God will not will to do so.[21]

This conception of the omnipotence of God, in all its four phases, is presented by Philo explicitly in opposition to every school of Greek philosophy. It is in accordance with this conception of the omnipotence of God that he rejects explicitly the Aristotelian conception of the eternity of the world, and this on the ground, as he says, that it "impiously" postulates in God "a vast inactivity." [22] By this he means that the assumption of a world existing eternally by the side of God would be a restriction on the power of God. By the same token, he makes the Platonic preëxistent matter out of which God created the world to have been itself created by God.[23] Here again the assumption of an eternal uncreated matter could be a restriction on the power of God. It is for this reason also that he rejects the Stoic conception of God as fate,[24] for fate means an internal limitation on the power of God to act according to the freedom of His will.

This conception of the omnipotence of God is most strikingly brought out by Philo in statements in which he tries to answer certain questions which must have arisen in his mind.[25] Why this order of nature? Why do stars sparkle in the sky? Why do birds fly in the air? Why do fish swim in water? Why do trees grow in the field? Pagan Greek philosophers had two answers. Accord-

[18] Cf. Philo, I, pp. 325–347.
[19] Cf. ibid., I, pp. 315–316.
[20] Cf. ibid., I, pp. 347–356.
[21] Cf. ibid., I, p. 316.
[22] Cf. ibid., I, pp. 295 ff.
[23] Cf. ibid., I, pp. 300–316.
[24] Cf. ibid., I, pp. 328–330.
[25] Cf. ibid., I, pp. 315–316.

ing to one answer, that order had been fixed, as if by fate, from eternity and it is unchangeable. According to another answer, that order is the result of chance and it may by chance break down. Against both these two views, Philo maintains that it is all the work of an omnipotent Deity. Before the world came into being God, through His omnipotence, could have created another kind of world, governed by another kind of law, a world in which there would have been no succession of day and night and of seasons, and one in which trees would grow in heaven and stars would sparkle on earth. And now that God created this world in its present order, God can upset that order, though He promised not to upset it unless He had to do it for some good purpose — a purpose, by the way, which more often than not He keeps hidden from us.

His opposition to the generally prevailing view among Greek philosophers as to the inevitability of the present order of nature is expressed by Philo in his oft-repeated statement that " all things are possible to God" (*πάντα θεῷ δυνατά*)[26] — a statement which reflects the Septuagint version of Job's address to God: "I know that Thou art able to do all things and that to Thee nothing is impossible" (Job 42:1).

These four principles of scriptural religion as laid down by Philo have been generally accepted in all the philosophies of the three revealed religions, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. They all accept the fact of a historical and final revelation, though they may differ as to which historical revelation was final. They all accept the view that while there was one historical revelation that was final, that final revelation was not a closed revelation; there was progressive revelation supplementary to the final revelation. They all accept the principle of the incomprehensibility of God, though there may be some difference of opinion among them as to how to interpret the terms predicated of God in Scripture. Finally they all accept the principle of divine goodness and of divine omnipotence in the manner they are conceived by Philo, and, though they are conscious of the many difficulties arising therefrom, especially the difficulty of the problem of evil, they

[26] Opif., 14, 46; cf. Jos. 40, 244; Mos. I, 31, 174; Qu. in Gen. IV, 17.

solve all these difficulties by the incomprehensibility of God's ways.

No wonder, then, that in modern philosophy, ever since the seventeenth century, those who undertook to depose scriptural philosophy concentrated their attack upon these four principles. Let us then examine some of the main arguments raised against the four points in scriptural philosophy as defined by Philo and let us also see how a hypothetical scriptural philosopher would try to refute these arguments.

III

As representative opponents of scriptural philosophy we shall take three philosophers, one from the seventeenth century — Spinoza; another from the eighteenth century — Hume; a third from the nineteenth century — John Stuart Mill; and let each one of us select a representative opponent of scriptural philosophy from the present century.

They all reject revelation. The arguments they use are all variations of the arguments used by those whom Philo described as "impious," arguments based upon analogy and upon the view that things alike in some respects must be alike in all other respects. Instead of the analogy with Greek myths used by the "impious" critic of Philo's time, Spinoza uses the analogy of "the Koran or the dramatic stories of the poets or ordinary chronicles." [27] Hume uses the analogy of "Arabians" in their records of the miracles of "Mahomet or his successors" and of "Grecian, Chinese, and Roman Catholic" authors.[28] John Stuart Mill endorses Hume [29] and adds a long ponderous argument to show how the alleged evidence for revelation will not pass muster in an English court of justice.

To this our hypothetical spokesman for scriptural philosophers would say: the same old argument for which we can only repeat Philo's answer.

[27] Tractatus Theologico-Politicus 5 (Op., ed. Gebhardt, III, p. 79, ll. 19–20).

[28] An Inquiry Concerning the Human Understanding X, 2 (Philosophical Works, 1854, IV, p. 138).

[29] "Theism, Part IV: Revelation," in Three Essays on Religion, New York, 1878, p. 217.

Both Spinoza and Hume reject the principle of the infinity of God in the sense of the unknowability of God.

In Spinoza this rejection is expressed in the proposition that "the human mind possesses an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God." [30] The argument by which he has arrived at this conclusion is not directly and explicitly stated. It may, however, be unfolded as follows:

Spinoza begins by asking himself: What do scriptural philosophers mean when they speak of God as unknowable? They mean, of course, that He cannot be the subject of a definition. And what do they mean by definition? They mean, of course, the Aristotelian kind of definition, which consists of a genus and a specific difference and which is conceived of as being prior to the *definiendum* and its cause.[31] Spinoza refers to this kind of definition as that which must "include the proximate cause" [32] and describes it as applying only to created things.[33] Taken in this sense, Spinoza admits that God is indefinable and hence unknowable. It is in this sense that he says "every substance is absolutely infinite," [34] by which, in the context in which he uses this proposition, he means that God is indefinable and unknowable.[35] But God, according to Spinoza, is immediately known by his third kind of knowledge, the intuitive knowledge, for God being an uncreated thing, which is in itself or is the cause of itself, becomes known to us through himself. It is in this sense that he says that "the human mind possesses an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God." [36] Thereby Spinoza challenges scriptural philosophers: You say that the existence of God can be demonstrated only *a posteriori*, and hence you say that, while His existence can be known, His essence is unknown. I say that His existence can be known *a priori*, and so His essence is known no less than His existence.

To this, I imagine our hypothetical refuter would answer that those for whom he speaks would deny that God is an object

[30] Eth. II, Prop. 47.
[31] De Anima II, 2, 413a, 15; Anal. Post. II, 10, 93b, 38 ff.
[32] Short Treatise I, 7, § 9.
[33] Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione § 96 ff. (Op., ed. Gebhardt, II, p. 35).
[34] Eth. I, Prop. 8.
[35] Cf. my Philosophy of Spinoza, I, p. 138.
[36] Eth. I, Prop. 47.

of immediate knowledge. He would remind Spinoza of his own reference to St. Thomas's denial that God could be proved *a priori*.[37] Indeed, some scriptural philosophers speak of direct vision of God, but this is not the same as the intuitive knowledge of Spinoza. None of the scriptural philosophers, their hypothetical spokesman would argue, would admit that the human mind can generate its own knowledge. All knowledge, he would say for them, must come from an external source, though not necessarily a sensible source. He would go further and maintain that no Greek philosopher ever believed that the mind generates its own knowledge. What is the so-called immediate knowledge of Plato if not the recollection of preëxistent ideas? And what are the indemonstrable immediately known premises of Aristotle if not something which have ultimately their source in sense perception? And the common notions of the Stoics, are they not based upon experience? Even the innate ideas of Descartes can be shown to have been considered by him as having an external source. Our hypothetical scriptural philosopher would admit, of course, that Spinoza has an explanation for his intuitive knowledge, which is consistent with his general system of philosophy, but he would challenge the explanation and the system.

In Hume, the argument against the unknowability of God is more direct and more explicit. Referring to all the scriptural philosophers as mystics, he addresses them as follows: "How do you Mystics, who maintain the absolute incomprehensibility of the Deity, differ from Sceptics or Atheists, who assert that the first cause of all is unknown and unintelligible?" [38] He thus argues from a lack of knowledge of the essence of God to a lack of knowledge of His existence.

Let us see how our hypothetical scriptural philosopher would answer this argument.

First, he would say it is an old argument. It is to be found in Thomas Aquinas.[39] It occurs in St. Thomas's refutation of those anti-rationalist theologians who maintain that the existence of God is a matter of faith only and cannot be demonstrated by

[37] Short Treatise I, 1; cf. Sum. Theol. I, 2, 1c; Cont. Gent. I, 10–11.
[38] Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (Philosophical Works, 1854, II, p. 451).
[39] Cont. Gent. I, 12.

reason. For in God, they argue, existence is identical with essence and, inasmuch as God's essence cannot be known, His existence cannot be demonstrated. This argument of St. Thomas's anti-rationalist theologians is exactly the same as that of Hume, except that in St. Thomas the argument is put in the mouth of those who, denying that God can be demonstrated by reason, fall back upon faith, whereas in Hume it is quoted in the name of those who, denying that God can be demonstrated by reason, became sceptics or atheists.

The answer given by St. Thomas is that the existence of God which is said to be identical with His essence is not the same kind of existence of God which can be established by demonstration.[40] Our hypothetical scriptural philosopher, I think, could do better than that. He would go about answering Hume as follows. He would say that Hume's contention that a God who is not known is a God that does not exist has in it a touch of Berkleyan philosophy. It implies that to exist means to be perceived, or to be known, so that if a thing is not known it does not exist. Our hypothetical scriptural philosopher would admit that, if one really believed that only that exists which is known, one cannot consistently affirm both that God exists and that God cannot be known.

But, scriptural philosophers, their hypothetical spokesman would continue, do not admit the main premise. They do not believe that to exist is to be known. They are old-fashioned philosophers, Aristotelians, if you please. With all their quarrels with Aristotle on matters divine, they are inclined to agree with him in matters mundane. And following the old custom of scriptural philosophers of documenting every statement they make, our hypothetical spokesman of scriptural philosophers would refer to Aristotle's discussion of the distinction between a relation in which the correlatives are simultaneous in nature and a relation in which the correlatives are not simultaneous in nature.[41] By a relation in which the correlatives are simultaneous in nature, Aristotle means a relation in which the existence of one of the correlatives necessarily implies the existence of the

[40] Ibid.
[41] Categ. 7, 7b, 15–35.

other, as, for instance, the correlatives "master" and "slave," in which the existence of "master" necessitates the existence of "slave" and *vice versa* the existence of "slave" necessitates the existence of "master." By a relation in which the correlatives are not simultaneous in nature, Aristotle means a relation in which one correlative may exist even when the other correlative does not exist. And he illustrates it by the example of the relation of "knowledge" to the "object of knowledge." This relation, he says, is one in which the correlatives are not simultaneous in nature, because the "object of knowledge" may have existence even when there is no "knowledge" of it, as, for instance, the squaring of a circle. And so, our hypothetical scriptural philosopher would conclude, there is a difference between the assertion that God's essence cannot be known and the assertion that God's existence, which is identical with His essence, can be demonstrated, for this is exactly a case of a relation between "knowledge" and the "object of knowledge," by which Aristotle illustrates the kind of relation in which the correlatives are not simultaneous in nature and of which he consequently says that one of the correlatives, "the object of knowledge," may exist, even though the other correlative, "knowledge," does not exist.

Then Spinoza, Hume, and Mill reject the infinity of God in the sense of infinite goodness by invoking the old problem of evil. Spinoza introduces the problem by the statement that "amidst so much in nature that is beneficial, not a few things must have been observed which are injurious" and he illustrates it by an old-fashioned list of evils: "storms, earthquakes, diseases."[42] Hume, with the scriptural expressions "cursed is the ground" (Gen. 3:17) and "the earth also was corrupted" (Gen. 6:11) and "the land was polluted" (Ps. 106:38) in the back of his mind, starts out with the general statement that "the whole earth . . . is cursed and polluted" and then proceeds to enumerate the various evils in the world in the form of an elaboration on an allusion to Hobbes' dictum about the war of every one against every one.[43] And John Stuart Mill, pointing to his-

[42] Eth. I, Appendix (Op., II, p. 79, ll. 18–20).
[43] Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Part X (op. cit., II, pp. 496 f.).

tory, shows how during all past ages in all countries mankind's lot was not a happy one.[44]

Logically, the problem presents itself to them in the form of a dilemma. Spinoza, dealing in general with the finitude of the world, which includes the evil therein, phrases the dilemma as follows: "If it is finite through its cause, this must be either because it *could* not give more, or because it *would* not give more. That He should not have been able to give more would contradict His omnipotence; that He should not have been willing to give more, when He could well do so, savors of *ill-will*, which is nowise in God, who is all *goodness* and perfection." [45] Hume, dealing directly with the problem of evil, phrases the dilemma in similar terms as follows: "Is He willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then He is impotent. Is He able but not willing? Then He is malevolent." [46] Both of them finally bring up the sovereign traditional solution, that of Zophar the Naamathite, to the effect that one cannot find out the deep things of God or attain unto the purpose of the Almighty. But Spinoza dismisses it contemptuously in his statement: "And so you fly to the will of God, the asylum of ignorance" [47] and Hume ironically remarks that he is willing to rest the argument with the statement "that these subjects exceed all human capacity, and that our common measures of truth and falsehood are not applicable to them." [48] John Stuart Mill soberly concludes: "If the motive of the Deity for creating sentient beings was the happiness of the beings He created, his purpose . . . must be pronounced . . . to have been thus far an ignominious failure." [49]

To all this our hypothetical scriptural philosopher would say that all those for whom he speaks are willing to rest their case with a declaration of our ignorance of God's ways and would ask: Does anybody know of a better solution? and is not resignation out of faith better than resignation out of despair?

[44] "Theism, Part II: Attributes," op. cit., p. 192.
[45] Short Treatise I, 2, 5 (Op., I, p. 20, ll. 18 ff.).
[46] Op. cit. (p. 501; cf. p. 505).
[47] Eth. I, Appendix (Op. II, p. 81, ll. 10–11).
[48] Op. cit. (p. 505).
[49] Op. cit. (p. 192).

They all also reject the infinity of God in the sense of infinite power, which, of course, involves infinite goodness with its implication of will and design. They each have a different argument against it.

In Spinoza there is the implication of an argument that scriptural philosophers in their view on God's omnipotence contradict themselves. Evidently drawing upon statements of Maimonides and St. Thomas to the effect that God has no power over impossibilities, such, for instance, as making contraries to be in the same subject at the same time and in the same respect, or changing himself into a body, or producing a square the diagonal of which be equal to its side, or making the past not to have been,[50] he finds this to be contradictory with their expressed belief that "all things are possible with God." This is implied in his argument that to say that God, if He willed, could not have created the world, is like saying that "God could bring about that it should not follow from the nature of a triangle that its two angles should be equal to two right angles." [51] It is also implied in his argument that it is more in accord with the conception of the "omnipotence of God" to say that the world, and this world only, continuously flows from God by the same necessity and in the same way as it follows from the nature of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles than to say that this world was created by a decision of God's absolute will out of many other possible worlds which He could have created.[52] Both these arguments mean that for scriptural philosophers to be consistent in their view of the infinite power of God they would also have to believe that God has power to change what is described by them as impossibilities.

Let us see how our hypothetical scriptural philosopher would deal with this argument.

To begin with, our hypothetical scriptural philosopher would say that not only Maimonides and St. Thomas, whom Spinoza undoubtedly had in mind in his criticism, but also all other scriptural philosophers would admit that God does change im-

[50] Moreh Nebukim II, 13 (3); Contra Gentiles II, 25.
[51] Eth. I, Prop. 17, Schol (Op. II, p. 61, ll. 27–32).
[52] Ibid. (p. 62, ll. 10–30).

possibilities. In support of this he would refer offhand to Origen [53] and St. Augustine,[54] among Christian philosophers, to the Mutakallimūn, among Muslim philosophers,[55] to Saadia,[56] among Jewish philosophers. He would also add, in passing, that all these scriptural philosophers had been reëchoing a sentiment expressed in the same words and illustrated by the same examples by such pagan philosophers as Alexander Aphrodisiensis [57] and Plotinus [58] and others.[59]

Then he would try to show that scriptural philosophers themselves were aware of this apparent contradiction in their own belief. Such an awareness of it, he would show, is implied in a passage in Origen. In that passage Origen quotes Celsus as ascribing to Christians the statement "as if it were said by us, that 'God will be able to do all things' (*δυνήσεται πάντα ὁ θεός*)." [60] Origen does not disown the view expressed in this statement. His remark "as if it were said by us" merely means that it is not a verbatim quotation from the New Testament. On the contrary, Origen himself in another place in the same work reproduces with approval the same view in his statement that "all is possible to God (*πᾶν δυνατὸν τῷ θεῷ*)," [61] which is a paraphrase of the New Testament statement that "all things are possible with God" (*πάντα δυνατὰ παρὰ τῷ θεῷ*).[62] But while he agrees with this view, he admits that Celsus "might with a show of reason have opposed it." [63] How Celsus could have opposed it "with a show of reason" he does not explain here. But from his statement elsewhere that Christians take the term "all" in the statement

[53] Contra Celsum III, 70; V, 23.

[54] Contra Faustum XXVI, 4–5.

[55] Ibn Ḥazm, Fiṣal fī al-Milal wa'l-Ahwā' wa'l-Niḥal (Cairo, A.H. 1317–27) IV, p. 192, ll. 13–14; Ghazālī, Tahāfut al-Falāsifah, XVII, 24, p. 292, ll. 2 ff. (ed. M. Bouyges); Maimonides, Moreh Nebukim I, 73, Prop. 10.

[56] Emunot ve-De'ot II, 13, p. 110, ll. 4–7.

[57] De Fato 30.

[58] Enn. VI, 8, 21.

[59] Cf. chapter on "Omnipotence" in R. M. Grant, Miracles and Natural Law in Graeco-Roman and Early Christian Thought, pp. 127–134.

[60] Contra Celsum III, 70.

[61] Ibid., V, 23.

[62] Mark 10:27; cf. Matth. 19:26.

[63] Contra Celsum III, 70. Incidentally, Celsus' statement would seem to be a paraphrase of the Septuagint version of Job's address to God (Job 42:1): "I know that Thou art able to do all things (*πάντα δύνασαι*)."

as not to include things that are "inconceivable" (*τῶν ἀδιανοήτων*) [64] it may be inferred that Celsus could have opposed the statement on the ground that it is contradictory to the Christians' own belief that God has no power over things that are "inconceivable." By things "inconceivable," incidentally, he means things which are in violation of such logical rules as the Law of Contradiction or the rules of mathematics and geometry. Our hypothetical scriptural philosopher would also show that this objection is explicitly quoted by pseudo-Dionysius in the name of a fictitious "Elymas the Magician" (cf. Acts 13:8), who found a contradiction between the Christian belief that "God is omnipotent" and Paul's statement that God "cannot deny himself" (2 Tim. 2:13).[65]

Finally he would try to answer this objection. It is not for lack of power, he would argue, that God does not change impossibilities; it is rather out of wisdom and justice. God could have created another world in which these impossibilities would have been possibilities. He can also destroy this world and create a new world in which the impossibilities would become possibilities. But having by His wisdom created this world and implanted in it these laws, He would not change these laws except when it served a certain purpose. For God does not change the laws of nature in vain, nor does He, like a stage magician, perform miracles to amuse or to impress the spectators. Miracles are performed and laws of nature changed by God only in His exercise of individual providence, for the purpose of preserving those who deserve to be preserved or for the purpose of instructing those who deserve to be instructed. Now, in the wisdom of God, the world is so ordered that to attain that purpose of miracles there is only a need for a change of the physical laws of nature; there is no need for a change of the laws of thought or of the laws of mathematics. Every miracle recorded in the scriptures, from the creation of the world to the resurrection of Jesus, are miracles which involved only a transgression of the physical laws of nature, for these miracles had purpose. No conceivable purpose could be served in the world as it is presently constituted

[64] Ibid., V, 23.
[65] De divinis nominibus VIII, 6.

for a miraculous change in the laws of thought or in the laws of mathematics. When scriptural philosophers, therefore, say that God does not change, in this world as it is presently constituted, the Law of Contradiction or the geometrical proposition about the three angles of a triangle, it is not an indication of a lack of power; it is an indication of the fact that God uses His power in accordance with His wisdom and His goodness.

This answer is implied in Origen's explanation of the statement that with God all things are possible by saying that "in our judgment God can do everything which it is possible for Him to do without ceasing to be God, and good, and wise" [66] or that "we maintain that God cannot do what is disgraceful, since then He would be capable of ceasing to be God, for if He do anything that is disgraceful (*αἰσχρόν*), He is not God." [67] In the same way, some Muslim Mu'tazilites explain that the impossibility for God to do evil is not because God has no power to do evil, but rather because He does not want to exercise that power, and this because of "His wisdom and mercy" [68] or because of "its being disgraceful (*ḳabīḥah*)." [69] So also Isaac Israeli (or Judaeus) says that "the fact that it was impossible for Moses to appear at the time of Adam is not due to the powerlessness of God, but to the fact that such a thing would not belong to wisdom but to absurdity." [70] Similarly Maimonides, speaking of the impossibility on the part of God to change human nature with regard to its freedom of action, says that this is not because God has not the power to do it but rather because, in His wisdom, "it has never been His will to do it, and it never will be." [71] It is also implied in St. Thomas's explanation of why God cannot do that which implies a contradiction by saying that a contradiction implies the notion of non-being and is therefore not "the proper effect" (*proprius effectus*) of Gods' power.[72]

[66] Contra Celsum III, 70.

[67] Ibid., V, 23. Cf. H. Chadwick's notes in his translation of Contra Celsum, ad loc.

[68] Al-Ash'arī, Maḳālāt al-Islāmīyīn, ed. H. Ritter, p. 555, ll. 6–8.

[69] Al-Shahrastānī, Al-Milal wa'l-Niḥal, ed. W. Cureton, p. 37, ll. 8–9.

[70] The Book of Substances, Fragment II, in A. Altmann and S. M. Stern's Isaac Israeli, p. 82.

[71] Moreh Nebukim III, 32; cf. II, 29.

[72] Cont. Gent. II, 22, Item.

In Hume the argument against the infinite power of God begins with the general proposition that "like effects prove like causes" [73] and then proceeds as follows: "For as the cause ought only to be proportioned to the effect; and the effect, so far as it falls under our cognizance, is not infinite; what pretensions have we, upon our suppositions, to ascribe that attribute to the divine Being?" [74]

Here, again, our hypothetical spokesman of scriptural philosophers would begin by pointing out that this is an old argument. And he would go on to sketch briefly the history of that argument. He would show how it appears in Plotinus in the form of the following questions: "How from the One, as we conceive it to be, can any multiplicity or duality or number come into existence?" [75] or, "How could all things come from the One which is simple and which shows in its identity no diversity and no duality?" [76] Substitute Hume's terms "infinite" and "finite" for Plotinus' terms "one" and "multiplicity" and you get exactly the same argument, based upon the same principle that "the cause ought only to be proportioned to the effect."

Then our hypothetical scriptural philosophers would show how Plotinus tried to solve this difficulty by making Nous, the first emanation from the One, a being who was one numerically but in whose nature there was an inner duality.

He would then go on to show how scriptural philosophers, such, for instance, as Maimonides [77] among the Jews and Thomas Aquinas among the Christians,[78] have discussed the problem raised by Plotinus as well as his solution, how they refuted his solution of the problem, and how, while agreeing with the principle that "the cause ought only to be proportioned to the effect," they argued that this principle applies only to a cause which produces an effect by necessity, but does not apply to an agent who acts by intelligence and will and design, such as God is conceived by all of them. Being an intelligent agent acting by will and

[73] Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Part V (Op. cit., p. 459).
[74] Ibid. (p. 461).
[75] Enn. V, 1, 6.
[76] Ibid., V, 2, 1.
[77] Moreh Nebukim II, 22.
[78] Contra Gentiles II, 21–24.

design, their God, they all argued, could produce a plurality of things, though He is himself one, and could produce a finite world, though He is himself infinite.

What Hume really did here, our hypothetical scriptural philosopher would conclude, was to rake up an old difficulty raised against the non-scriptural conception of God, to overlook the arguments of scriptural philosophers that this difficulty cannot be raised against their scriptural conception of God, and to flaunt it before an innocent world as a new argument against the scriptural conception of God.

An argument against the infinite power of God is also advanced by John Stuart Mill.[79] But as the argument has not been summarized by him in one quotable passage, we shall try to summarize it ourselves in some brief intelligible form; and, despite Mill's disparagement of the syllogism, we can find no better method of making his argument intelligible than by reducing it to a syllogism. Thus syllogistically stated, his argument runs as follows:

Everyone who employs means in carrying out his purpose is finite;

God employs means in carrying out His purpose;

Therefore, God is finite.

Here, too, the scriptural philosopher would begin his refutation of this argument by pointing out that the implication of powerlessness in the attribution to God of action for a purpose and by the use of means was a difficulty not unknown to scriptural philosophers of the past. It is this very difficulty that had moved a certain class of Muslim theologians to deny that God acts by the use of means. As represented by Averroes, they believed "that the One, that is, God, acts upon all beings without any intermediary" [80] and, as represented by Maimonides, they believed "that God does not do one thing for the sake of another and that there are no causes and effects, but that His actions are all the direct result of His will," [81] and, as represented by Thomas Aquinas, they believed "that God alone is the immediate

[79] "Theism, Part II: Attributes," op. cit., pp. 126–167.

[80] Long Commentary on Metaphysics IX, Comm. 7 (ed. Venice, 1574, fol. 231 H) and XII, Comm. 18 (fol. 305 F).

[81] Moreh Nebukim III, 25.

cause of everything wrought." [82] This view of Muslim orthodoxy, which was repudiated alike by Averroes and Maimonides and St. Thomas, was later accepted, for the very same reason of safeguarding the infinite power of God, by the Christian philosopher Nicolaus of Autrecourt.[83]

Then our hypothetical scriptural philosopher would try to show how this argument could be answered. He would try to show how God's employment of means differs from the employment of means by other beings. All other beings employ those means because, without them, they are powerless to do the things they are resolved to do. Not so is God. He has the power to do everything directly himself without any means. In fact, whenever He wishes, He does things directly himself without any means. And even when, for certain reasons, known or unknown to us, He employs means, those means act in complete obedience to His will and nowise do they limit His power. Supporting this assertion of his, our hypothetical scriptural philosopher would quote such statements of Thomas Aquinas as that "it is erroneous to say that God cannot himself produce all the determinate effects which are produced by any created cause" [84] and that "it is clear that . . . nothing is a cause of being except in so far as it acts by God's power." [85] He would also quote the view of Maimonides, according to whom the creation of the world was a direct act of the divine will without any intermediate causes [86] and that if in the created world God in His wisdom acts through intermediate causes, these intermediate causes are said by him to act as if commanded by God, with the result that "of everything which is produced by any of these causes it can be said that God commanded that it shall be made or said that it shall be so." [87] And all this, he could conclude, ultimately goes back to Philo who divided God's actions into those which were performed by Him directly and into those performed by Him by means of inter-

[82] Sum. Theol. I, 105, 5c.
[83] Cf. J. R. Weinberg, Nicolaus of Autrecourt, pp. 84 ff.
[84] Sum. Theol. I, 105, 2c.
[85] Cont. Gent. III, 67.
[86] Moreh Nebukim II, 18 (2).
[87] Moreh Nebukim II, 48.

mediary causes,[88] and those intermediary causes have no power of their own but act only at the bidding of God.[89]

What Mill really did here, our hypothetical scriptural philosopher would conclude, was to rake up an old difficulty, to overlook the answer given to it, and garnish it up as a new argument.

* * *

In my brief survey of some of the reactions to the Philonic conception of God in modern philosophy I have tried to deal with the subject as a historian and not as a theologian. Knowing that scriptural philosophers in the past have raised difficulties against their own belief in revelation and in the various meanings of the infinity of God, I wanted to find out how the difficulties raised by themselves compared with the arguments raised against them by their opponents ever since the seventeenth century. We are often told that the intellectual climate in modern philosophy ever since Spinoza is different and therefore the arguments raised against such beliefs as revelation and the incomprehensibility, goodness, and omnipotence of God are also different. But while indeed it is to be granted that the climate is different, the storms and lightnings and thunders, as we have seen, are the same. They are not the clash of newly discovered facts with old beliefs. They are still the clash of one kind of interpretation of facts with another kind of interpretation of the same facts.

When philosophers since the seventeenth century deny revelation it is not because new facts have been discovered to discredit it, but rather because, as in the time of Philo, the belief in revelation is held to have no greater historical validity than the myths of the Greeks, though in modern times a greater verisimilitude is lent to this argument by the greater knowledge we now possess of similar myths among other peoples. Logically the argument is still, as Philo characterized it, the refusal to distinguish between Scripture and myth.

When they deny the belief that God is infinite in the three senses in which He has been described as infinite it is again not because new facts have been discovered to discredit this belief

[88] Cf. Philo, I, pp. 269–270, I, 223, 282.
[89] Cf. ibid., I, pp. 332–347.

but rather because, like Job of old, they refuse to acknowledge that one cannot find out the deep things of God and to attain unto the purpose of the Almighty. Logically it is still the same old question whether God is like the world or unlike the world, whether He is part of nature or is above nature, though occasionally the issue is obscured by the irrelevant contention that our knowledge of nature is now much greater than in the past. With all our increased knowledge of nature, its facts, not only in their raw state but even in their scientific correlations, are still susceptible of the age-old interpretation of rationalized scriptural theology.

The Philonic type of religious philosophy may be described after Matthew 9:17 as a process whereby old wine is put into new bottles. The speculations about God in modern philosophy, ever since the seventeenth century, is still a process of putting old wine into new bottles. There is only the following difference: the wine is no longer of the old vintage of the revelational theology of Scripture; it is of the old vintage of the natural or verbal theology of Greek philosophy. Sometimes, however, even the bottles are not new; it is only the labels that are new — and one begins to wonder how many of the latter-day philosophies of religion would not prove to be only philosophies of labels.

THE FELLOWSHIP (חבורה) IN THE SECOND JEWISH COMMONWEALTH

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THE חבורה (fellowship) was a religious society founded in the villages and towns of Jewish Palestine during the Second Commonwealth in order to foster observance of the laws of tithing and ritual purity.[1] The sources on the fellowship are preserved in rabbinic literature, and the חבורה has therefore been associated with the Pharisees; one must, nonetheless, retain the distinction between the חבורה and the whole Pharisaic sect, since there is no evidence that all Pharisees were members of a fellowship. Membership represented a status recognized by other members and not a formal affiliation with an organized society. The חבר (member) of such a fellowship undertook to carry out even in the company of non-observant men those ritual laws which were generally neglected. Thus they taught their observance by example and precept. At the same time, the members distinguished themselves from the common society by their strict adherence to ritual laws which separated them in crucial relationships of daily life. Thus members cast up a barrier between themselves and the outsider (עם-הארץ), who was by definition a source of ritual defilement.[2]

[1] J. Baumgarten, "Qumran Studies," Journal of Biblical Literature, LXXVII, 3, 249–257, states, "All in all it seems quite difficult to make out of the *haburah* anything more than a society for the strict observance of ritual cleanliness." I have found no evidence to contradict Dr. Baumgarten's judgment. On the contrary, there is no indication that all Pharisees were members of a fellowship, although all members were Pharisees and accepted their views on Jewish law. There is, furthermore, no indication in the sources I have examined that the fellowship was an *organized* society at all, with officers or a formal governing body. A person became a member by stating his intention to keep the rules of the fellowship before three old members; he entered into the framework of obligations membership imposed. Membership thus entailed nothing more than a recognized status.

[2] Buechler's thesis (cf. A. Buechler, Der Galilaische Am Ha-Ares des Zweiten Jahrhunderts, Vienna, 1906) that the laws of ritual purity and strict tithing applied primarily to members of the priestly cast achieved some popularity among historians of this period. This thesis has been demolished by G. Allon in his essay, cited in detail below, "The Application of the Laws on Ritual Purity" (cf. G. Allon, Researches in the History of Israel, Tel Aviv, 1957, I, 148–177). Buechler thought

In ancient civilization, the commune was a widespread social form for religion,[3] and in Jewish Palestine itself there were several such groups of dedicated men. Indeed, the fellowship did not achieve the formal and articulate structure one finds in parallel communes.[4] The specific form of the fellowship was governed by the particular obsession of the members: the laws concerning food. These laws demanded more than what many men accepted as their proper religious obligation. The mass of farmers was careful to give heave-offering (תרומה גדולה), but they did not always hand over the other agricultural dues to the priest and Levite. Hence meticulously observant men had to take care to separate all necessary tithes and offerings.[5] Likewise the asso-

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that the extension of these laws to the common people took place in the second century C. E.; because of the rabbis' bitterness at the Hadrianic persecutions, they devised these laws to separate the Jewish people once for all from the gentile world. Allon discusses and refutes this thesis as well.

[3] In Nabatea there was an institution which was apparently a religious fraternity; the members met in private chambers to dine, according to archaeological remains at Petra and elsewhere. The word in the Nabataean inscription is חבר; cf. J. Cantineau, Le Nabatéen, II, Lexique, p. 93 (Paris, 1932): "חברוהי = les membres d'une confrérie religieuse." For a discussion of the many parallels between the Pythagorean schools and the Palestinian sects, cf. I. Lévy, La Légende de Pythagore de Grèce en Palestine, Publications du Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes, no. 250, Paris, 1927, Book IV; Pharisaic parallels, pp. 236–263; Essenic parallels, pp. 264–293. Lévy's theory, that the Pharisees were the Palestinian disciples of Alexandria's Hellenistic Judaism, deserves further consideration. Lévy states, "Le Pharisaisme qui, après l'extinction du Sadducéisme conservateur du vieil esprit biblique, fut le judaisme tout court, a concilié Moise et Pythagore, ou, si l'on veut, Platon." (Lévy, op. cit., p. 342.)

[4] For a comparison of the fellowship with the Qumran community, cf. especially S. Lieberman, "Discipline in the so-called Dead Sea Manual of Discipline," Journal of Biblical Literature, LXXI, 4, 199–206. The forms of the two associations are analogous in many significant details, as Professor Lieberman demonstrates. For an extended interpretation of these parallels, cf. C. Rabin, Qumran Studies (Oxford, 1956), 1–21, and the comments of J. Baumgarten, op. cit. Cf. also my article, "Qumran and Jerusalem: Two Jewish Roads to Utopia," Journal of Bible and Religion, XXVII, pp. 284 f.

[5] The common people apparently recognized the biblical injunction to give heave-offering (cf. T B Sotah 48a), but were not careful to separate other offerings. Significantly, the laws concerning the Pharisaic fellowship were inserted in the tractate on "doubtful produce" (דמאי), the doubt being whether produce has been fully and properly tithed. The observance of these laws involved separating first-tithe and heave-offering of the tithe, as well as second-tithe, to be eaten in Jerusalem, and poor-man's tithe (these last were given alternately, in the seven-year cycle, years one, two, four and five were for second-tithe, three and six for poor-man's tithe). On the enactment of the laws of "doubtful produce" cf. Sotah 48a (Mishnah Maaser Sheni, 5:15); C. Albeck, Seder Zeraim (Tel Aviv, 1957), 69–70; and especially, S. Lieberman, Hellenism in Jewish Palestine (New York, 1950), p. 143, note 28.

ciates held that even secular food (חולין) had to be eaten in a state of ritual purity and the masses of men did not do so.[6] Nonetheless, the Pharisaic traditions ascribed to the ancients the practice of eating even common food in a state of priestly purity,[7] and the commandments to tithe were biblically enjoined. This was, therefore, a natural concern for pious men.[8] The forms of the fellowship had become fixed by the time of Hillel and Shamai (first century C. E.), for by then disputes on details of the rule were already in progress, indicating both a fixed tradition and a sufficient interval in which to forget some details.

The member was a Jew who undertook to give all tithes and other sacred offerings from his foods and who undertook to pre-

[6] All men ought to remain ritually pure, according to rabbinic sources. Cf. Allon, op. cit., pp. 169–176. Ritual purity was a widespread obsession. Cf. *inter alia*, the following: Philo, De Specialibus Legibus, III, 205; Josephus, Contra Apion, 2:26; Antiquities III, xi, 3; cf. especially W. Brandt, Juedische Reinheitslehre und Ihre Beschreibung in den Evangelien (Giessen, 1910), pp. 1–55; and also J. Harrison, Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion (Cambridge, 1903), pp. 24–29; M. Nilsson, History of Greek Religion (2nd ed., Oxford), pp. 84, 85, 218–220. Buechler states (in "Levitical Impurity of the Gentile in Palestine before the year 70," Jewish Quarterly Review, n.s. XVII, 80–81), "They assumed that Levitical impurity of the gentile affected only the priest on duty [in the Temple] and the ordinary Jew only when he was ritually pure for a visit to the Temple and for participation in a sacrificial meal. The private associations between Jew and gentile were in no way restricted, and commercial and other relations were not affected by the Levitical purity ascribed to the gentile." On p. 48 of the same article, Buechler asks, "Is there any, even the slightest indication in rabbinic literature that the touch of a gentile caused a defilement, and that such a defilement was taken into account by the strictest Jew not an Essene in Temple times?" One such indication at least will be found in Mishnah Avodah Zarah, 4:9:

דורכין עם נכרי בגת, אבל לא בוצרין עמו

The reason for the prohibition is obviously that the Jew will assist the gentile in the process by which grapes become susceptible to contamination and the gentile will forthwith — by touch — contaminate them! (Buechler would argue that this applies only to the priest, but no evidence supports this view.) Cf. also Tosefta Makshirin 3:7. Allon discusses this mishnah (op. cit., p. 161, note 59), and states that the sages regarded ritual purity as the obligation of every Jew; since many did not keep the laws of purity, the sages "found it necessary . . . to seek out the company [of observant men] and to set themselves apart by means of a formal act of undertaking, to fulfil meticulously these laws." Cf. also TB Hullin 2:6; and the dispute of the schools of Hillel and Shamai, TB Berakot 8:2, 3, in which all parties agree that it is forbidden to render foods unclean during a meal, disagreeing on the best means to prevent impurity.

[7] Abraham ate his secular food in ritual purity, TB Baba Metsiah 87a; B'reshit Rabbah, ch. 44. For Saul, cf. Midrash Tehilim, ps. 7, ed. Buber, p. 32a; Pesikta de R. Kavana, ed. Buber, 78; Pesikta Rabbati, ch. 15, ed. Friedman, p. 68a. For a complete discussion of this question, cf. Buechler, op. cit., pp. 119–124, and Allon, op. cit., pp. 158–169, esp. p. 159, note 52.

[8] Cf. for example the view of Philo, De Specialibus Legibus, III, 205.

serve both for himself and others the ritual purity of his foods. Anyone might make such a commitment, man, woman, or child.[9] The fellowship cut across family ties. Wives might become members without their husbands, and children without their parents, though if a child was born into a family known to adhere to the rule, he was assumed to be observant until he indicated otherwise.[10] There were no caste distinctions, for some members of the priestly and Levitical castes were associates and others were not.[11] Furthermore not all Pharisees were adherents of the order; many kinds of men claimed to be Pharisees, and at both early and late periods, some sages were considered outsiders in relation to the fellowship.[12] A slave might become an associate and his master remain an outsider, and vice versa.[13] The specific rules of membership were exhaustive; whoever adhered to them became a member; beyond them, there were no distinctions between members and outsiders, and all outsiders were considered reliable on questions of ritual fitness of foods (כשרות), even though they were not reliable to give evidence as to their ritual purity.[14]

By transcending family, class, and caste distinctions, the order established a new, if limited polity in the old society of village and town. This polity, based on the willingness of the fellow to assume obligations imposed upon all men by an ancient and

[9] Cf. Tosefta Demai 2:2–3:10, pass., and S. Lieberman, Tosefta Kipshutah (N. Y. 1955), ad loc. Specific citations follow.

[10] The fellows cut across family lines, cf. Tos. Dem. 2:15, 16, 17, 3:5, 9.

[11] The distinction between member priests and Levites and others is implicit in Mishnah Demai 2:2, 3 and Tos. Demai 2:2, 3. There is no apparent economic distinction either; at least, according to Tos. Demai 2:19, a journeyman apprentice is a member and his craftsman-teacher is not (and vice versa); cf. also Tos. Demai 3:5, 3:9, 2:15.

[12] Seven kinds of Pharisee are listed in Sotah 22a (TP Sotah 5:7; cf. TP Berakot 9:7). Cf. also Tos. Demai 2:13, the opinion of Abba Shaul, and the parallel passage in Bekorot 30a; and Professor Lieberman's comment, op. cit., ad loc. Cf. also TP Demai 2:3 and Professor Lieberman's comment and emendation to the passage, Tarbiz, XX, 110–111: A sage in Babylon tells some women to be cautious in approaching him, for he is in the status of an outsider in relationship to ritual purities:

אמר לון, הבאכלון מינאין עם הארץ אני אצל הטהרות.

cf. also L. Finkelstein, Introduction to the Treatises Abot and Abot of Rabbi Nathan, New York, 1950, p. 243.

[13] Tos. Demai 3:6, 3:9; TP Demai 2:2 inter alia.

[14] TP Demai 2:3, "עם הארץ נאמנים על הכשרות." This is a point often misunderstood in secondary works on this period.

unrepudiated ethic, was a disruptive element in the social order, recalling the words of Jesus (Matthew 10:34–37), ". . . I have come to set a man against his father and a daughter against her mother. . . ." Adherence to a rule that broke through all social categories represented a considerable complication for society. The fellowship posed a peculiar problem for the city: at many intimate and crucial relationships in daily life, the member was guided by a complicated rule that made social intercourse enormously intricate. For the new member, affiliation with the fellowship represented a step toward individualism, and resulted in the disintegration of customary social relationships.

Becoming a member of the order caused a revolution, therefore, in the life of the new member. Personal relationships had to be reconstructed, and new patterns of behavior determined according to the specific regulations of the fellowship. The first obligation, for the outsider who entered into the status of "reliability," was to give all required tithes and heave-offerings. The second, for the "initiate," was to guard the ritual purity of these holy offerings, and in addition, to eat even secular produce in a state of ritual purity. In the third and final stage, the novice had to keep even those common foods he did not consume from ritual contamination both at home and in commerce. A person entered the order by means of a formal undertaking, given unconditionally.[15] A newcomer might, however, proceed stage by stage to accept the obligations of a member, and he might at any point choose to go no further. He remained, in such a case, in his present status, and was not expelled from membership entirely. Such flexibility followed from the very purpose of the fellowship: to encourage Jews to fulfil neglected religious duties. At each stage, the newcomer reached a level of observance higher than before; if, therefore, he chose to remain only partially affiliated, this did not conflict with the purpose of the fellowship.

The primary sources on the process of entering the fellowship are as follows:

[15] Tos. Demai 2:3, Bekorot 30a. Cf. Lieberman, op. cit., p. 211, note 9. Cf. also Tos. Dem. 2:13, TP Dem. 2:3; Bekorot 30b on the formal undertaking. The undertaking is a kind of vow or oath, cf. Lieberman, op. cit., p. 217. For the possibility of accepting only the first obligation of membership, cf. Tos. Dem. 2:3, 5, 11.

Mishnah Demai 2:2

המקבל עליו להיות נאמן — מעשר את שהוא אוכל, ואת שהוא מוכר, ואת שהוא לוקח ואינו מתארח אצל עם הערץ. ר׳יהודה אומר, אף המתארח אצל עם הארץ נאמן. אמרו לו על עצמו אינו נאמן, כיצד יהא נאמן על שלאחרים?

He that undertakes to be reliable must give tithe from what he eats and from what he sells and buys, and he may not be the guest of an outsider. R. Judah says, Even he that is the guest of an outsider may still be reckoned trustworthy. They replied, He would not be reliable in what concerns himself, how then could he be trustworthy in what concerns others?

Mishnah Demai 2:3

המקבל עליו להיות חבר — אינו מוכר לעם הארץ לח ויבש ואינו לוקח ממנו לח, ואינו מתארח אצל עם הארץ, ולא מארחו אצלו בכסותו.

He that undertakes to be a member may not sell to an outsider [foodstuff that is] wet or dry, nor buy from him [foodstuff that is] wet; and he may not be the guest of an outsider, nor may he receive him as a guest in his own garment.

Tosefta Demai 2:2

המקבל עליו ארבעה דברים, מקבלים אותו להיות חבר, שלא יתן תרומה ומעשרות לעם הארץ, ושלא יעשה טהרות לעם הארץ, ושיהא אוכל חולין בטהרה. המקבל עליו להיות נאמן, מעשר את שהוא אוכל, ואת שהוא מוכר, ואת שהוא לוקח . . .

He that imposes upon himself four things is accepted to be a member: not to give heave-offering or tithes to an outsider; not to prepare his pure food in the house of an outsider; and to eat even ordinary food in purity. . . .

Tosefta Demai 2:11

ומקבלין לכנפים ואחר כך מקבלין לטהרות אם אמר איני מקבל עלי אלא לכנפים בלבד, מקבלין אותו. קבל עליו לטהרות ולא קבל עליו לכנפים, אף על טהרות אין נאמן.

And he is accepted first with regard to "wings" and is afterwards accepted for purities. If he only imposes upon himself the obligations concerning the "wings" (cleanness of hands) he is accepted; if he imposes upon himself the obligations concerning pure food, but not concerning "wings," he is not considered reliable even for pure food.

Tosefta Demai 2:12

עד מתי מקבלין? בית שמיי או' למשקין שלשים יום, לכסות שנים עשר חודש. ובית הלל או' זה וזה לשלשים יום.

Until when is a man accepted? The school of Shamai say, For liquids, thirty days; for clothing, twelve months. The school of Hillel say, for either, thirty days.

The problem of defining the stages of affiliation is thus not simple. The Mishnah and Tosefta Demai give two different definitions, and the additional comments in the Tosefta require explanation. From Tosefta Demai 2:11 and 2:12, it is clear that there were several stages of entry into the fellowship.[16] An outsider had to conduct himself according to the rule of the fellowship, and afterwards was received for "wings" and purities. He was nonetheless kept in the status of a novice with regard to liquids until after thirty days, and became a full member after twelve months (according to the school of Shamai). Professor Lieberman cites R. Jonah, who explains the difference between the definition of the Mishnah and that of the Tosefta by suggesting that the Tosefta deals with conditions to be fulfilled before one can be admitted, while the Mishnah deals with obligations incumbent on the established member.[17] It seems, rather, that the definitions of both texts deal with stages of affiliation before full membership. I suggest, following R. Jonah, that the Tosefta deals with the earliest stage, which would be an initiatory period; and the Mishnah deals with a later stage, which would be a novitiate. The description of the two stages of membership in Tosefta Demai 2:11 and 2:12 could, consequently, represent a broad definition of all the major concerns of the neophyte, and the Tosefta Demai 2:2 and Mishnah Demai 2:3 represent specific details incumbent on the newcomer. The sources relate, apparently, as follows:

תוספתא דמיי 2:2		תום' דמיי 2:10
1. שלא יתן תרומה ומעשרות לע"ה	=	1. טהרות
2. ושלא יעשה טהרות ל(=אצל) ע"ה	=	2. טהרות
3. ושיהא אוכל חולין בטהרה	=	3. כנפים
4. ומקבל עליו להיות גאמן, מעשר את שהוא וכו'		

[16] Lieberman, op. cit., p. 216, para. 37.
[17] Cf. also Rabin, op. cit., p. 12, note 7.

משנה דמיי 2:3		תוס׳ דמיי 2:11
1. אינו מוכר לע״ה לח ויבש		
2. אינו לוקח ממנו לח	=	משקין
3. אינו מתארח אצל ע״ה		
4. ולא מארחו אצלו בכסותו	=	כסות

If this paradigm is a correct arrangement of the sources,[18] the stages of affiliating to the fellowship become clear. At the first stage of affiliation, the newcomer undertook to be *reliable* (נאמן) to give tithe from what he eats as well as from what he sells and purchases (from others for resale).[19] At the second level a reliable

[18] According to this interpretation of the several sources, *wings*, *purities*, *liquids*, and *garments* in Tos. Demai 2:11, 12, have specific meanings as detailed below. The following evidence supports this explanation:

Wings means "washing of hands" according to Professor Lieberman and earlier commentators. Cf. Lieberman, op. cit., pp. 215–216; Bekorot 30a and Rashi ad loc.; the Aruk HaShalem, listing under כנף. Professor Lieberman explains this unusual usage by reference to Kelim 17:14, Tos. Kel. B. M. 7:5; TP Nazir 4:10 (TB Nazir 46b).

Purities comprehends both concern for the ritual purity of food that the initiate eats (i.e., that he will not prepare pure foodstuffs near an outsider), but also concern for preserving the purity of consecrated food. For a similar ambiguity, cf. Oholot 18:2, Bekorot 3:11, 3:2, 3:13. This latter connotation is preserved in TP Demai 2:2 by Rav Mana, who equates "purities" with "tithes." Furthermore, Kossovsky (Concordance to the Tosefta, Jerusalem, 1939) states that "purities" in the Tosefta connotes כל דבר הנעשה ונשמר בטהרה; for the detailed meaning of "purities" in the TP passage cited, cf. Lieberman, op. cit., p. 215.

Liquids in Tractate Makshirin connotes "that which renders dry produce susceptible to become impure," precisely the meaning assigned here. Cf. inter alia Makshirin 1:1, 6:4, and Albeck, Seder Taharot (Tel Aviv, 1959), p. 411. The word משקה as used in Leviticus 11:34 was interpreted by the rabbis to mean a liquid (one of seven) capable of rendering dry produce susceptible to impurity; hence liquids in Tos. Demai 2:11 connotes concern not to bring a liquid into contact with dry produce. Parallel usages are in Pesahim 17b, Terumot 11:2, etc. Liquids likewise implies, and as its primary meaning, concern to protect the purity of liquids.

Garments means, according to Rashi (Bekorot 30b–31a; cf. also Lieberman, op. cit., ad loc.) that the novice must learn to keep his garment in the state of purity appropriate to an associate. Cf. Mishnah Hagigah, ch. 2 at the end; for an instance of such concern, cf. Tos. Taharot 5:16. If the novice accepts the hospitality of an outsider, he will render his garment unclean by virtue of the uncleanness of the chairs; when the outsider is dressed in his own garments, he is a source of impurity, for his garments can render an object unclean when they are carried (cf. Hagigah 2:7). The general term *garments* in Tos. Demai 2:11 apparently connotes these two specific details. Cf. also Mishnah Taharot, 4:5.

For another explanation of the difference between the two definitions, cf. L. Finkelstein, The Pharisees (Philadelphia, 1938), II, p. 662.

[19] Tos. Demai 2:3, Mishnah Demai 2:2. In the matter of tithes, the reliable person must not only keep the laws himself, but he must keep others from transgressing as well. In the second stage, the initiate must keep only his own food in a state of ritual purity. The novice, however, must be careful for others as well.

person entered the stage of *initiation*, in which he began to keep the laws of eating food in ritual purity.[20] Thus he began his affiliation by showing particular concern for ritual offerings, and for the purity of the food the initiate ate and prepared for himself. At the third stage, the *novitiate*, the newcomer undertook to guard the ritual purity of food under any circumstances; thus he could not sell any foodstuff (wet or dry), for in either case the outsider would contaminate the food by his touch, nor could he purchase from him food that is wet, and thus contaminated (moist produce was susceptible to uncleanness and dry produce was not), nor could he receive the outsider as a guest, on account of his contaminated garment. Following the period of reliability, the *initiatory* period was divided into two parts. First, the man became an initiate for "wings," that is, for the cleanness of his hands when he ate. Afterwards he obligated himself regarding "purities," that is, to preserve the sanctity of consecrated produce, withholding it from a priest or Levite who was an outsider, and who would probably consume the offerings in a state of impurity. In the *novitiate*, likewise, two periods punctuated entry into the fellowship. At first, the novice had to preserve his garments and liquid foods from ritual impurity, not allowing impurity to come upon any food in his possession or under his authority, by refraining from commerce in produce with outsiders, and by not purchasing from an outsider food that had been made ritually susceptible to uncleanness. At the same time, he had to take care to keep his garments from defilement, so that they might not contaminate his food; and he had to take care that the garments of outsiders did not touch his foodstuffs or defile them in any way. This novitiate lasted for thirty days in regard to both liquids and garments, according to the school of Hillel, or for thirty days in regard to liquids and twelve months in regard to garments, according to the school of Shamai. At the end of the three periods, of reliability, initiation, and the novitiate, the associate was considered dependable in all matters of tithes, of the ritual purity of his own food, of food he sold, and of his garments. Thus the following stages become apparent:

[20] Tos. Demai 2:2, following Professor Lieberman's emendation. Cf. Lieberman, op. cit., p. 210, notes 4 and 5.

1. Reliability — (1) concern for tithing
2. Initiation — (1) concern for tithing and (2) for ritual purity of the initiate's own food, (2A) first for the cleanness of hands, and (2B) later for the cleanness of ritually-sacred foods.
3. Novitiate — (1) concern for tithing, (2) for ritual purity of the novice's own food, and (3) for food in his domain; and (4) (possibly) later, for the purity of his garment.

Some people conducted themselves privately according to the rule of the fellowship, particularly giving tithes meticulously. In such a case, a man was received immediately into the initiatory stage and instructed how to become a fully accredited member. If not, he was instructed, and only afterwards received into the initiatory stage.[21]

A later dispute may be illumined by this sequence of affiliation. During the latter half of the second century C. E., Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Judah disputed on whether a person in the status of reliability for tithes might accept the hospitality of an outsider and remain reliable. Rabbi Meir did not consider such hospitality permissible, apparently on account of the candidate's eating untithed food. Rabbi Judah answered, according to the same assumption, "In all the days of householding, people never hesitated to eat in one another's homes, and even so, the produce in their own homes was properly tithed." If, however, it was entirely possible for an individual to set aside tithes from the food which an outsider served him, and this is stated explicitly, then it is difficult to comprehend Rabbi Meir's tradition, prohibiting someone in the fellowship from accepting an outsider's hospitality. Apparently Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Judah held ancient traditions on the sequence of affiliation. Rabbi Meir's source forbade such hospitality,

[21] On private conformity to the rule, cf. Lieberman, op. cit., p. 214. I only propose this interpretation as most sensible, for if the newcomer was immediately received into the final stage of membership in the order, how was he to carry out the complicated observance of ritual purity "as he goes along"? He could, on the other hand, certainly give the necessary tithes and heave-offerings without further instruction. Hence I propose that the initial reception was into the stage of reliability, and he was instructed, "as he goes along," in the responsibilities of the initiate.

and Rabbi Judah's tradition was that such a prohibition against an outsider's hospitality did not apply at this stage (but rather at the later, novitiate level). Hence Rabbi Judah was correct, according to the sources, in disputing Rabbi Meir's contention that the hospitality of an outsider was forbidden to a reliable person; such hospitality was indeed prohibited to the novice, but on account of ritual contamination, not on account of tithes.[22] Indeed, it is explicitly stated that this prohibition did apply to the full member.[23]

After the destruction of the Temple, the fellowship apparently changed considerably; by the end of the second century C. E. the rule of the order ceased to be defined in its original terms at all. One discovers an elaboration of the conditions for becoming a חבר, "R. Judah says, 'He may not rear small cattle [a conservation measure], nor be profuse in vows of levity, nor contract corpse uncleanness, nor minister in the banquet hall.' They said to him, 'These things never came within the rule.'" This was correct, for the original articles of the fellowship did not cover such matters.[24]

A man who undertook to enter the fellowship had to do so before three members, although his dependents might declare their adherence before him. If he left the fellowship, he had to reassume these obligations upon return, if he might return at all. According to one opinion, if he violated his oath secretly, he was never eligible to reaffiliate, for he was a hypocrite. According to another, if he violated his oath secretly, then only by his own admission had he become suspect, and since a man's testimony against himself

[22] I have found no support for this hypothesis.

[23] Mishnah Demai 2:3.

[24] For evidence of this change in the nature of the fellowship, cf. Sotah 9:15; Tos. Shabbat 1:7; Bekorot 30b; Lieberman, op. cit., p. 216, para. 40, states, "According to the tradition of the Babylonian Talmud, Abba Shaul hands on an ancient law, but afterwards, when the Temple was destroyed, the standards of ritual purity (observed by the priests) were raised, so as not to place credence in any man, even a sage." Professor Lieberman cites Maimonides, The Book of Cleanness, Laws of Midras and Moshav, ch. 10, para. 3. Cf. also J. Klausner, History of the Second Commonwealth (Tel Aviv, 1953), III, 119; and the extensive variations in the definition of the חבו in Bekorot 47b.

Rabbi Judah's definition is emended by J. N. Epstein, Introduction to Tannaitic Literature (Jerusalem — Tel Aviv, 1957) to read as presented here; cf. Rabin, op. cit., p. 12, note 9. Rabin's treatment of the rule of the novitiate varies considerably from the view presented here. Rabin, op. cit., 18–20.

is discounted, he may indeed return in repentance; but if he violated his oath publicly, and others gave evidence against him, he might never return. A later sage taught that he might reënter the fellowship under any circumstances, as it is written (Jeremiah 3:14), "Return, O faithless children. . . ."[25] Furthermore a tax farmer was expelled from the moment he took his seals of office, although when he ceased to collect taxes, he could rejoin the association through a new, formal undertaking.[26]

The new member of the fellowship could no longer associate with any man freely and carelessly. In many ways he had to rearrange his habits of living into a new and complex pattern. The legal literature of the rabbinic period preserved many details of the relationship between members and outsiders. Obedience to the rule of the order meant that concern for the sanctity of foods entered into hitherto simple social relationships and the implications of this rule were translated, in minute detail, into everyday affairs. One principle governed every relationship: absolutely no compromise between the rule of the fellowship and the demands of the workaday world. The only exception, "for the sake of peace," was actually a mere leniency, and not a compromise at all.[27] At each of the three stages, the rule multiplied the problems bound up in living with men who were indifferent to obligations the member considered sacred. The obvious solution to these problems was either to retreat to neighborhoods dominated by the fellowship or to flee entirely from the common society. There is absolutely no indication that the fellowships pursued either alternative. The fellowship chose instead to articulate the rule of the order, and to elaborate it to guide the member through the infinite, specific situations of daily life. These laws represented precise statements of the measure of the law, no more, no less. Such elaboration of law has been viewed with little sympathy by modern scholars, "Nothing was left to the free personality, everything was placed under the bondage of the letter. . . . A healthy moral life could not

[25] Cf. Bekorot 31a; Tos. Demai 2:9, and Lieberman, op. cit., ad loc. TP Demai 2:3; TB Avodah Zarah 7a, and the comment of the Tosafot there. I follow Professor Lieberman's comment, op. cit., p. 214, paras. 28–29.

[26] Tos. Demai 3:9; TB Bekorot 31a; TP Demai 2:3; Lieberman, op. cit., p. 224, paras. 15–17.

[27] Mishnah Gittin 5:9 (parallel in Shevi-it 5:9; TB Gittin 61a).

flourish under such a burden. Action was nowhere the result of inward motive, all was, on the contrary, weighed and measured. Life was a continual torment to the earnest man, who felt at every moment that he was in danger of transgressing the law."[28] This body of law was, however, fundamentally descriptive and enormously helpful. It was useful for people who adopted the rule of the fellowship, a rule they held as ancient and as sacred as the Ten Commandments, to know what to do and what not to do in the commonplace and homely situations of daily life. Having agreed, for example, to preserve the ritual purity of foodstuffs, the associate needed to know to what extent he was obligated to keep food only partially within his domain out of the hands of an outsider, in a common inheritance or in a joint agricultural or commercial enterprise. The formidable growth of law was a necessary consequence of the urban, unsegregated character of the fellowship. In the city and in the company of unobservant men, the potential range of problems to be solved by the fellowship rule was infinite. With precise and detailed information for guidance, the member might keep both his place in society and his sacred resolve.[29]

The fundamentally uncompromising[30] articulation of law be-

[28] E. Schuerer, History of the Jewish People in the Time of Jesus Christ (Edinburgh, 1894), II, pp. 102, 106–107, 124. For other viewpoints on the *halachah* in general, cf. R. Herford, The Pharisees (London, 1924); G. F. Moore, Judaism (Cambridge, 1954), Finkelstein, op. cit.; cf. also Tractate Avot, pass., and Psalm 19:7–14.

[29] Finkelstein, op. cit., I, 74–75, and the same author's article in the Harvard Theological Review, XXII, 209–210.

[30] This is not to imply that the Pharisaic viewpoint was extreme. On the contrary, the tendency was, on the whole, moderate, given the range of possibilities that presented themselves to the sages. Cf. for many examples, Tractate Kelim, pass., and the Code of Maimonides, Book of Cleanness (Book Ten), tr. Danby (Yale Judaica Series, Vol. VIII; N. H., 1954), particularly the preface of Professor Julian Obermann (pp. v–xiv), and the introduction by Canon Danby (pp. xxxiii–xlv); also the commentary Eliyahu Rabbah to the Sixth Division of the Mishnah by the Gaon Rabbi Elijah of Vilna, in Danby, The Mishnah (Oxford, 1933), pp. 800–804; and cf. also the comment of Allon, op. cit., p. 176, who suggests that the following pattern is discernible in the disputes on ritual purity: the Sadducees demanded the strictest possible interpretation of the laws of ritual purity, but limited the application of these laws to the priests in the Temple itself; the Essenes likewise interpreted the laws very strictly, and applied them to every situation in daily life, but separated themselves into communes of observant men and women; among the Pharisees, the tendency to apply the laws of purity to daily life conflicted with the impulse to limit severely the laws of purity. Allon continues, "There were two basic principles guiding the Pharisees, one, to make the law congruent to the needs of the living, and the other, to extend the principle of

came manifest in social, commercial, agricultural, and personal relationships.[31]

The member had, for example, to keep his cooking utensils out of possible contact with an outsider, who would render them unclean for several reasons.[32] Hence if he lived in the same courtyard with an outsider, he could not leave his vessels in the yard. He could not leave his pots or dishes in the domain or control of an outsider at any time.[33] On the other hand, an outsider was not suspect of touching the property of a member if he entered his domain without permission; he was presumptively careful not to contaminate the dwelling of a member.[34] If the member married the daughter of an outsider or purchased his slave, he had to adjure the newcomer to the rule of the order; if, on the other hand, his daughter or slave entered the domain of an outsider, the member was assumed to remain observant until proven otherwise. In any case the undertaking had to be renewed.[35] A man might enter

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sanctity to every man (not only the priests) and to every place (not only the Temple). The second principle obligated the sages to teach Israel to observe ritual purity, and to demand complete separation [from uncleanness]. However, life demanded the limitation of these laws, for it is not possible, or at least very inconvenient, to keep them. Therefore . . . the traditions, such as washing hands before a meal, which were not difficult to keep, or which were particularly crucial, such as the prohibitions concerning women in the menstrual period, were carried out." For a discussion of the implications of the laws of purity in economic life, cf. L. Ginzberg, Jewish Law and Lore (Philadelphia, 1955), pp. 79–84, 109, 113, 120–122; S. Zeitlin, History of the Second Jewish Commonwealth, Prolegomena (Philadelphia, 1933). Professor Zeitlin discusses the modification of the laws of purity for the sake of convenience, and concludes, "The Pharisees from time to time modified the halakot in order to make the law accord with the requirements and demands of life."

The entire question of the sociological application of the laws of ritual purity has by no means been exhausted. It would be worthwhile, for one thing, to know in detail and through a study of *texts* (*contra* Schuerer) what these laws actually meant in the daily life of the Palestinian Jew during the several major epochs of the *halachah* in the Second Commonwealth and afterward; and for another, what were the principles that governed the articulation and elaboration of the laws of purity.

[31] This is merely a brief summary of certain social relationships affected by the fellowship and its rule. A complete survey would entail not only a study of the specific laws which deal with the relationship of member and outsider, but also a consideration of each of the laws of ritual purity and impurity.

[32] Midras-uncleanness, Maddaf-uncleanness, etc. Cf. Toh. 8:2, and Maimonides, Book of Uncleanness, ad loc.

[33] Taharot 8:1, 2, 3.

[34] Ibid., 8:5.

[35] Tos. Demai 2:16, 17 (parallel TB Avodah Zarah 39a; Tos. Avodah Zarah 3:9; Bekorot 30b. Cf. Lieberman, op. cit., ad loc.

the fellowship without his wife; if he was reliable (for tithes) and his wife was not, then associates might purchase food from him, but might not accept his hospitality, for he was as one who lives "in the same basket with a snake." If his wife was reliable and he was not, then associates might accept his hospitality but not purchase food from him.[36]

Family relationships were no less complex. In matters of inheritance, the associate might make no exchange of food with an outsider who shared his inheritance; but he might say, "Take the wheat there, and I shall take this wheat here," leaving to the outsider food that was either ritually unclean or susceptible to impurity, and keeping the ritually clean food for himself. He might not be the direct cause of an outsider's receiving food. He did not, on the other hand, have to purchase an entire inheritance of food for cash in order to prevent the outsider's receiving food.[37] The son of a member might visit the non-observant members of his parents' families, so long as the outsiders did not give him unclean food. If they did, he would defile his own home, and hence might not visit his relatives any longer. Hospitality was difficult; if, for instance, a man "left an outsider within the house awake, and found him awake, or asleep and found him asleep, or awake and found him asleep, the house remained clean [the possibility that the outsider moved about and contaminated the house is discounted], but if he left him asleep and found him awake, the house is unclean, according to Rabbi Meir, or that part of the house is unclean which he could touch by stretching out his hand, according to the sages."[38] Apparently the outsider was considered normally careful not to defile the house of the associate, as was seen above, for here again it would not be possible to allow him to remain alone in a member's home at all. A fellow of the order could not in any case accept the hospitality of an outsider,

[36] Tos. Demai 3:9; cf. TP Demai 2:2. For the expression "dwell with a serpent," cf. TB Ketuvot 71a. For problems of an associate who worked as a house servant of an outsider, cf. Tos. Demai 3:6; TP Demai 2:2. The servant had to see to tithing the food, and if it was known that the waiter was a member, then the affiliated guests might assume that the food had been tithed. But it is most important to note that a member might in fact work for an outsider, and even serve food to his table.

[37] Mishnah Demai 6:8, 9.

[38] Tos. Demai 2:15, 3:5 (parallel TB Yevamot 114a). If the child ate unclean food at the relative's, he could render his own home unclean. Cf. Taharot 2:2.

or receive him into his own home unless he put on ritually clean garments.[39] While a member could not prepare for an outsider any kind of food, and vice versa, an outsider might still watch the pot of a member; he might not add spices. Wives of members and of outsiders might prepare food together under conditions of extreme caution.[40] In any case, the word of an outsider on the ritual purity of food or on its condition with regard to tithes and heave-offerings was accepted when he spoke *en passant* or in his innocence.[41] An outsider might not act as the agent of a fellow, or vice versa, in any matter to do with foodstuffs, although the outsider might act as agent of the member to purchase dry stuffs when the act was clearly specified in advance ("Buy me cabbages from the corner store and from no one else").[42] If a member left his produce in the care of an outsider, the food remained in its presumptive state of tithes and heave-offerings, but it was rendered unclean if it was moist. If an outsider entered an associate's house, "such time as the member can see them that go in and out, only foodstuffs and liquids and open earthenware vessels become unclean, but if the householder could not see them that go in and out, even though the outsider could not move himself or was tied up, all becomes unclean." [43]

Commercial relations were similarly transformed. It was difficult for a member of the fellowship to sell foodstuffs, for his only customers could be other members (but there is no evidence that members refrained from such commerce entirely). A farmer, for example, might sell olives only to another associate, according to the opinion of the Shammaites, and although the school of Hillel permits him to sell to a reliable person, still the scrupulous members of the latter school followed the opinion of the school of Shammai. There were other limitations on what foods the member might sell to outsiders under any circumstances; on the other hand, members might bring their grain to an unaffiliated miller,

[39] Tos. Demai 2:2, 3.

[40] Tos. Maaserot 3.13; Tos. Demai 4:29, 3:1, 2:2; 4:31, 32. Tos. Demai 4:27 (compare 2:2). Mishnah Taharot 7:4.

[41] Tos. Demai 2:24; Maaserot 5:2; Mishnah Makshirin 6:3. Cf. also Tos. Demai 5:5; Mishnah Demai, 4:6. Compare, however, to note 14.

[42] Tos. Demai 2:20, 2:21, 2:22; 3:2. Compare 4:26, 5:3; 8:1. Mishnah Demai 6:22; Tos. Demai 8:1.

[43] Tos. Demai 4:22, 28; Mishnah Taharot 7:5. Cf. also ibid., 7:1, 2; 8:1, 2.

since grain was dry-milled. They might also employ outsiders in their foodshops, since their rules were presumably obeyed; and if an associate was in partnership with an outsider, other members might still purchase food at the shop and assume that the member had removed the proper tithes. If the associate took a field as sharecropper, he had to give tithes for his landlord, deducting them from the latter's share; under certain circumstances, the associate-landlord had to tithe the crops of his non-observant tenants from his own share. Finally, a journeyman-member might study a craft with an unaffiliated master and vice-versa; in the latter case, the journeyman was considered observant of all rules of the fellowship during his working hours, but if he wanted to enter the order, he had to give a formal undertaking.[44]

Just as a member of the fellowship could not give priestly or Levitical dues to an outsider, so he could not present his first-fruits to an outsider, or repay to an unaffiliated priest any fines or recompense due to the priesthood for misuse of priestly produce. The associate had to pay fines to a priest of the fellowship, and the latter compensated the unaffiliated priest for the produce he had lost. If the consecrated produce of priests was mixed together, then the associate had to purchase the share of the outsider (unlike the situation of joint inheritance). The garments of an outsider could not, of course, come into contact with consecrated food; if they did, the priest had to burn the produce.[45]

While these laws indicate the configuration of rules which guided the fellowship, they do not by any means exhaust the vast legal literature relevant directly or indirectly to the life of the members.[46] Membership in the fellowship was achieved through a

[44] Mishnah Demai 6:6; Tos. Demai 2:3 (Mishnah Demai 2:2). Cf. Tos. Demai 3:15. Other sources include the following: Tos. Demai 2:18–19, 3:5, 8, 9; Mishnah Demai 3:4, 6:1, 8. Cf. also Mishnah Terumot 3:4, Maaserot 3:13, 7:12.

[45] Bikkurim 3:12; Tos. Demai 3:1, 2, 3, 5; Mishnah Demai 2:2, 3; Tos. Terumot 7:4; TP Terumot 6:1; Mishnah Taharot 4:5.

[46] For other references, cf. the following, inter alia, in the TB: Berakot 36b, 40b; 47b; Shabbat 13a, 32a; Erubin 37a, b; Pesahim 4a, b; Yoma 8b; Moed Katan 22b, 26b–27a; Hagigah 18b, 22a, 23a, 24b, 25a, 26a; Kiddushin 33b; 56a, b; Sotah 49a, b; Sanhedrin 8b, 40a, 72b, 90b; Avodah Zarah 7a, b, 39a, 41b, 42a, 64b, 70b; Makkot 6b (parallel Sanhedrin 8b), 9b; Shevuot 16a; Niddah 6b, 15b, 33b; Kelim 9:2 (parallel Eduyot 1:14); Oholot 5:5 (cf. Hagigah 3:4, Parah 5:1); Makshirin 6:3; Zabim 3:2, Taharot 7:4.

On the question of whether the fellowship had some kind of communal meal, cf. Pesahim 113b, and the discussion of Rabin, op. cit., p. 32; Rabin cites Mishnah

pattern of actions which demonstrated the initiate's devotion to certain neglected Jewish traditions. Dedicated to keep the ordinances on tithing and the purity of foods, the associates defined the rule of their fellowship, educated newcomers in the manner to keep it, and determined a sequence of obligations by which an outsider might learn by degrees to enter into the full observance of the Jewish faith. With neither a formal organization nor a sovereign authority to enforce a man's undertaking, the members of the fellowship followed the teaching of Shammai, "Say little and do much!"[47]

Sanhedrin 8:2, and the statement of A. Geiger in "Sadducaer und Pharisaer" (Jud. Zeitschrift, 1868, p. 25). Rabin says, "Nothing in the context of Tosefta Demai suggests that the *haburah* held common meals, but we must remember that the word can also be employed in a general way for a group holding a common meal in connexion with some religious occasion. . . . With all due reserve I think that the new evidence of the scrolls gives grounds for reviving Geiger's theory that the common meals formed an essential part of *haburah* life and influence various features of Pharisee practice. . . ." The relationship of the fellowship to the חבורה של מצווה is not yet clear; the חבורה discussed here may be simply one example of such societies or status-groups formed to carry out particular religious obligations.

[47] Avot 1:15. I acknowledge with gratitude the valuable criticism of Dr. Abraham Goldberg of the Hebrew University and especially that of Dr. Haim Zalman Dimitrovsky of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America. Dr. Haim Rabin of the Hebrew University offered welcome advice. This paper was originally written for the seminar at Columbia University, in "Problems in Comparative Religion," of Professor Horace Friess, and Professor Jacob Taubes, who originally suggested the study.

WAS HEGESIPPUS A JEW?

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Eusebius answers the question in the affirmative, but gives this answer as an inference from facts which he shares with his readers. This is in H. E. iv. 22, when he is in fact taking leave of him. He has made important use of Hegesippus in Books ii, iii, and iv of his Historia Ecclesiastica.

He says that Hegesippus displays the fact that it was from among the Hebrews that he came to the Christian faith (*ἐμφαίνων ἐξ Ἑβραίων εαὐτὸν πεπιστευκέναι*). He thus credits Hegesippus with having been an orthodox Palestinian Jew before his conversion to Christianity. This would, in the estimation of Eusebius, carry two consequences. One is linguistic. Hegesippus would understand Hebrew and Aramaic. The other is a matter of knowledge. Hegesippus would be familiar with the oral traditions current among Palestinian Jews. Both things are displayed, Eusebius thinks, in the work to which he owes all the knowledge he has about Hegesippus, a work by Hegesippus consisting of five *Memoranda*[1] (*ὑπομνήματα*). It is a safe inference from what Eusebius says about it, that the work was accessible to him, and that each *Memorandum* of the five was a self-contained tractate.[2] The five together, Eusebius says, put most fully on record the sentiments of Hegesippus. This statement accords ill with the opinion expressed by Dr. W. Milligan in the Dictionary of Christian Biography, s.v., Hegesippus, that the full title of the work was *πέντε ὑπομνήματα ἐκκλησιαστικῶν πραξέων*, an opinion based, no doubt, on Jerome, saying in De viris inlustribus, c. 22, that Hegesippus "wrote a history of all ecclesiastical events from the passion of our Lord down to his own period . . . in five volumes." This assertion has been responsible for the widespread belief that Hegesippus is to be reckoned as the father of Church history. But there

[1] The usual word is *Memoirs*, but this half begs the question of the nature of their contents.

[2] His first citation is *ἐν τῷ πέμπτῳ αὐτοῦ ὑπομνήματι.*

are two reasons against accepting it. The first is negative. Jerome shows no sign of knowing anything about Hegesippus except what he reads in Eusebius. The second reason is positive. Eusebius expressly says that he derived his account of the martyrdom of James the Just from the fifth and last of the *Memoranda*, whereas, if Jerome's dictum were justified, this event should have been recorded, at latest, in the third. Further, Stephen Gobarus, quoted by Photius (cod. 232), and expressly citing from the fifth *Memorandum*, shows Hegesippus attacking what appears to be a Gnostic claim to eschatological knowledge not revealed in Scripture. It would appear, in short, that the *Memoranda* of Hegesippus were primarily doctrinal and polemical, and only incidentally concerned with history. The purposes of Eusebius, on the other hand, were wholly directed to Church history. He found Hegesippus a godsend, for his allusions to a part of the subapostolic Church for which he was almost devoid of sources. It is reasonable to suppose that Eusebius left unused very little of the historical contents of the *Memoranda* of Hegesippus. In other words, the eight passages of the Historia Ecclesiastica which cite Hegesippus contain practically all the history to be extracted from the five *Memoranda*. In that case, the *Memoranda* must have been, for the most part, taken up with matters other than history.

Eusebius, as we see, thought that what he had told his readers out of the *Memoranda* supported the conclusion that Hegesippus was both learned in Hebrew and Aramaic and versed in the oral traditions of the Jews. On the first point Eusebius was no good judge. What C. J. Elliott said, in his article, "Hebrew learning among the Fathers," in the Dictionary of Christian Biography, calls for little revision. It was only ignorance of Semitic languages that could hide from Eusebius the fact that Hegesippus was even less a Hebraist than himself. Again, since it is necessary, if one is to judge of someone's knowledge of the oral traditions of the Jews, to have some such knowledge oneself, once more it was Eusebius' ignorance that prevented him from recognizing that Hegesippus must have been utterly cut off from contact with Jewish life and customs.

In yet another way, imperfect knowledge led Eusebius into error with regard to Hegesippus. This time it was his vagueness on

chronology. At his first mention of Hegesippus, in H. E. ii. 23, where he invokes him to confirm and supplement what he has derived from Clement of Alexandria on the martyrdom of James the Just, he finds Hegesippus the superior source because, as he assumes, Hegesippus belonged to the immediate sub-apostolic generation (*ἐπὶ τῆς πρώτης τῶν ἀποστόλων γενόμενος διαδοχῆς*). It appears, in fact, that at this stage Eusebius committed himself to this idea, and assumed that Hegesippus was throughout telling in his own words what he had known directly or learned from others by word of mouth. He finds the history of the Judaeo-Christian church related with a quaint old-world simplicity, and takes this to be a confirmatory sign that Hegesippus (*ἁπλουστάτῃ συντάξει γραφῆς ὑπομνηματισάμενος*) himself lived in that early time in Christian history. He does not consider the possibility of his reproducing a written source, even when he had read the passage in which (H. E. iv. 22) Hegesippus shows that he is writing after the elevation of Eleutherus to the Roman bishopric.[3] Now the Chronicon Paschale places the death of Hegesippus in the reign of Commodus. So we must suppose the *Memoranda* to have been written, or at least finished, about A.D. 180. And this cannot be reconciled with the supposition that their writer was a direct witness regarding the fortunes of Judaeo-Christianity before its overthrow at the hands of Barcochba.[4] Nevertheless Eusebius thought him to be such a witness. And deriving his ideas of primitive Judaeo-Christianity from the Acts of the Apostles, he accordingly pictured Hegesippus as having been a Hebrew of the Hebrews until converted to Christ. In H. E. iv. 8 Eusebius produces an argument for believing that Hegesippus was writing earlier in the reign of Hadrian than the Barcochba rising. He says that, besides his old-world style, Hegesippus signifies the period in which he came to be recognized as a writer (*καθ' ὃν ἐγνωρίζετο σημαίνει χρόνον*) by a reference to the cult of Antinoüs. Hegesippus is quoted as saying that the pagans "to this very day" (*ὡς μέχρι νῦν*) erect cenotaphs and temples to dead men, as we see by the instance of Antinoüs, drowned in A.D. 130 while the games named after him are a present-day (*ἐφ' ἡμῶν*) reminder. Like Theophilus in

[3] Eleutherus was bishop, 175–189.
[4] In A.D. 132.

Ad Autolycum, Hegesippus is appealing to the Euhemerist explanation of polytheism, mainly drawn from ancient cults. In such a context, the instance of Antinoüs would be, by comparison, ὡς μέχρι νῦν, and the Antinoeian ἀγὼν could be described as ἐφ'ἡμῶν γενόμενος; and this at any time in the second Christian century. Eusebius strains the meaning of words when he claims that this passage shows that Hegesippus was writing in the neighborhood of A.D. 130. If, then, we must place the activity of Hegesippus some fifty years after Jerusalem had become Aelia Capitolina, it carries the consequence that he must have drawn upon a written source or sources for his references to Judaeo-Christian history. There seems, in fact, to be no reason for thinking of more than one such source. Was the author of this source "learned in Semitic languages and conversant with the oral tradition and customs of the Jews?"

The answer must be in the negative. The Judaeo-Christian writer (and *a fortiori* Hegesippus) regards the text of the Septuagint, and not that of the Hebrew Old Testament, as canonical. In H. E. ii. 23, the martyrdom of James is said to have been prophesied in Isaiah 3.10. In the Hebrew the sense of this verse is "Say to the righteous that it shall be well with him, for they shall eat the fruit of their deeds." But the Septuagint runs "Let us bind the righteous man, for he is troublesome to us. Therefore the fruit of their very works shall be destroyed." It is, of course, only the Septuagint that could be taken as a prophecy of martyrdom. In the Hegesippus text, however, ἄρωμεν (let us destroy) is substituted for δήσωμεν (let us bind). This is clearly a Christian "improvement" upon the text of the Septuagint, and was adopted to make the Isaian text a prophecy of the crucifixion of Christ. Justin so uses it, and in his Dialogue, c. 137, finds himself driven to excuse the substitution of ἄρωμεν for δήσωμεν. The fact that, in our Judaeo-Christian source, the Isaian proof-text should be applied to James is significant of the place held by James in Judaeo-Christian regard. But it could only be done, and done with no excuse for altering the text of the Septuagint, by people who were even less in touch with actual Judaism than Justin. It follows that the Judaeo-Christian community responsible for this narrative was very Hellenized. That is indeed what might be expected in a com-

munity that was able, soon after A.D. 70, to domicile itself in the ruins of Jerusalem beside the *castrum* of the Tenth Legion.[5] And it explains the savagery with which this community was treated by the forces of Barcochba. For before that tragedy came upon it, that community had so lost all sense of the actualities of the Temple prior to its destruction as to take literally the symbolic saying that "James alone had the right to enter the Holy Place because he wore no wool but only linen"; so literally as to make him grow callous knees from incessant kneeling to intercede in the Holy Place. Such fancies could only be entertained in a community utterly severed from actual Judaism and wrapped up in a thought-world of its own.

Again the remoteness of the Judaeo-Christian writer (and *a fortiori* of Hegesippus) from actual Jewry is shown in the passage where James is being stoned. "One of the priests, the sons of Rechab son of Rachabim, to whom the prophet Jeremiah testified, cried 'Stop! What are you doing? The Just is praying for you.'" It seems here to be supposed that, because Jeremiah brought the Rechabites into a priest's chamber, they became priests, and were the ancestors of a "righteous" group among the Jewish priests of the Temple. The allusion is to Jeremiah 35 (in the Septuagint, 42). The Septuagint chapter begins "Go to the house of Archabein," a loose memory of which may have been responsible for the substitution of "Rechab son of Rachabim" for Jonadab the son of Rechab. The Jeremiah-text lent itself for polemical use against Israel. But it could only take such a form as it does in this Hegesippus-passage at the hands of people utterly out of touch with non-Christian Judaism.

At one point the writer upon whom Hegesippus is drawing stirs memories of the time when Hebrew was understood in the Judaeo-Christian community. James, he says, besides being called "the Just," had the title ὠβλίας, which he interprets as "ramparts of the people." In the eyes of Eusebius, no doubt, this passage was an example of the understanding which Hegesippus had of the Hebrew tongue. But Professor H. J. Schoeps, studying this passage in the fourth paper of his collection Aus frühchristlicher Zeit

[5] For this history, see A. von Schlatter, Die Tage Trajans und Hadrians, Gütersloh, 1897.

(Tübingen, 1950), agrees with Zahn and Nösgen in seeing certain proof that Hegesippus' knowledge of Hebrew and Aramaic was very slight. Yet he can say (op. cit., p. 120) "As we know, Hegesippus was a Palestinian by birth, a Christian of Jewish blood." We may well ask, how do we know it, apart from Eusebius saying so? For nothing else has emerged that enables us to "place" Hegesippus, except that he had access to Judaeo-Christian writings, and that Eusebius had access to a copy of his *Memoranda*.

Now the martyrdom story in H. E. ii. 23 ends, "They buried him (James) beside the sanctuary, and his monument is beside the sanctuary still." It is inconceivable that this last statement was true at the time when the *Memoranda* was written, and the rebuilding in Aelia Capitolina had been planned to blot out the signs of its Jewish past. It is conceivable, however, that, prior to A.D. 132, there was standing a monument erected by the Christians, beside the Temple ruins at the spot where James was believed to have suffered. But if conceivable, it is not very likely. Statements of this kind are very commonly made for narrative effect. And it would be rash to infer the real existence of any monument (cf. W. W. Tarn, J. Hell. St. xlviii, 1928, p. 208 for a present tense taken over from a source), least of all a Christian monument. But that Hegesippus should transcribe the statement without seeing anything amiss in it, argues against his being resident in Palestine. There is no reason why, because he obtained Judaeo-Christian documents, he should be Palestinian. After A.D. 135, Judaeo-Christians would be encountered anywhere in the Eastern part of the empire, rather than in Palestine itself, from which the war must have driven them forth as refugees. Hegesippus belonged to the East, because he passed through Corinth on his way to Rome. And he can well have encountered his Judaeo-Christian document anywhere in the Orient where refugees from Palestine might have come to rest. He could not have been, himself, one of the refugees. For telling, as he does, how the pure faith of the Jerusalem church came to be corrupted by heresies, he could not, had he been a Judaeo-Christian, have remained altogether silent as to the tragedy of A.D. 132. Nor, had he written anything of that, could Eusebius have omitted to use it. We can thus come no closer to Hegesippus than to see him as a Greek-speaking Christian of what Celsus

recognized as "the Great Church."[6] He found the Judaeo-Christians whom he encountered orthodox by his own standards. And he discovered that they attributed their orthodoxy to the fact that, down to their dispersal, they had had a succession of *desposyni* (kinsmen of Christ) as heads of their church, for most of the time.[7] The history that supported this claim told that, after the succession of Symeon ben Clopas, a certain Thebuthis broke away from his obedience and led some into heresy, which quickly branched into diverse forms. This calamity is laid to the account of "the seven heresies among the people" (i.e., of Israel). This conception of seven heresies in Israel was also known to Justin,[8] and, through some other source than Justin, to Epiphanius.[9] Hegesippus mentions six heresies, and apparently understands the Thebuthians to be a seventh [*ἀπὸ τῶν ἑπτὰ αἱρέσεων, ὧν καὶ αὐτὸς* (Thebuthis) *ἦν ἐν τῷ λαῷ* (i.e., in Israel, but Israel identified in the context with the tribe of "Judah and of Christ")]. Thus the passage asserted that it was heresy among the Jews that sowed heresy among the Judaeo-Christians, through a member of one of the Seven Sects who entered the Judaeo-Christian flock. Accordingly, in H. E. iii. 32, the martyrdom of Symeon is attributed to information lodged by "the heresies" of his being of Davidic descent. H. E. iii. 35, which seems to continue this history, describes the successor to the martyred Symeon as being a Jew named Justus, chosen "from among the thousands" of Judaeo-Christians. This expression suggests some disparagement, and regret for the ending of the succession of *desposyni*. This rings of a time when the continuance of that succession was a serious issue for Judaeo-Christians, a time that can hardly exceed the last years of Trajan and the first of Hadrian. But a parenthesis follows the mention of Thebuthis in H. E. iv. 22. This asserts that from the Seven Sects derived "Simon who founded the Simonians, Cleobius who founded the Cleobians, Dositheus from whom came the Dositheans, Gorthaeus and his Gorathenes and Masbotheus and his Masbotheans, and from these grew again the Menandrians, Marcionites, Carpocratians, Valentinians, Basilidians and Satornilians." This pa-

[6] See Origen, Contra Celsum, v. 59.
[7] Until the death of Symeon, in Trajan's reign.
[8] Dialogue, c. 80.
[9] Ancoratus, a different list from Justin's.

renthesis cannot be part of the Judaeo-Christian document, but must be a deduction by Hegesippus from the Judaeo-Christian story of the corruption of the virgin Church. But this gives us a viewpoint for Hegesippus. He finds in his source the doctrine that Christian heresies are an evil legacy from the Seven Sects of the Jews, and hails it as an explanation (to their disadvantage) of the Gnostic heresies with which the Great Church was struggling. No one writing about A.D. 180 could find the succession of the *desposyni* a live issue. But the doctrine that a regular and Christ-ordained episcopal succession had preserved the pristine purity of the faith proved welcome indeed. For it would seem that it was from his Judaeo-Christian history that Hegesippus obtained the idea which he followed up on his visit to Rome, that the Gnostic heresies are refuted by the doctrine of churches that possess a regular episcopal succession. Hegesippus was, in this, the precursor of Irenaeus. In confirmation of this estimate, we may revert to the reference by Stephen Gobarus to Hegesippus. Gobarus was a sixth-century Tritheist who (Photius says) harped upon the bizarre opinions expressed in the Fathers. He says of Hegesippus that he fell out, for some whim, with the saying "Eye hath not seen nor ear heard, neither has it entered into the heart of man, what things God has prepared for the righteous." For Hegesippus said that "Such words are vainly uttered, and those who use them lie against the Holy Scriptures and the Lord who says 'Blessed are your eyes, for they see, and your ears, for they hear' (Matt. 13.16)." The Scripture lied against will be I Corinthians 2.9, where almost the words in question are followed by "But unto us God revealed them through the Spirit." We know, from Hippolytus (Philosophumena 5.22) that an initiate among the Justinian Gnostics "beholds whatever things eye hath not seen, and ear hath not heard, and which have not entered into the heart of man." Here is a claim that without Gnostic initiation it is not possible to know those things which Scripture says have been revealed to the Church. This argument, moreover, occurred in the same fifth *Memorandum* that derived the Gnostic heresies from the Seven Sects of Judaism. And we must accordingly see in Hegesippus an able anti-Gnostic protagonist for the Great Church.

We have, however, still to look at Eusebius' "trump card." In

a sentence that has given great difficulty to translators, Eusebius credits Hegesippus with knowledge of the "Gospel according to the Hebrews." The sentence[10] runs Ἔκ τε τοῦ καθ' Ἑβραίους Εὐαγγελίου καὶ τοῦ Συριακοῦ, καὶ ἰδιώς ἐκ τῆς Ἑβραΐδος διαλέκτου τινὰ τίθησιν. It seems quite clear that the *Memoranda* were written in Greek; for in H. E. iii. 20 Eusebius says that he cites from them κατὰ λέξιν. We must therefore understand from the above sentence that, in this Greek work, Hegesippus put down statements derived from the "Gospel according to the Hebrews," which, Eusebius implies, was not extant in Greek. It is fortunately not necessary for our enquiry that we should in the least enter upon the vexed question of the different works to which reference is made in early Christian writers under the name of "Gospel according to the Hebrews." We are only concerned with the work that Eusebius knew by that name, and used, in his Theophany, to illustrate passages in the canonical Gospels. In one of these passages, of which the Greek has survived (MPG 24. 155), he describes this Gospel as having come down to us in Hebrew lettering (τὸ εἰς ἡμᾶς ἦκον Ἑβραϊκοῖς χαρακτῆρσιν Εὐαγγέλιον). And in one of which only the Syriac survives (I quote H. Gressmann's translation, GCS III, ii, p. 183), he says "in dem Evangelium . . ., das unter den Juden in hebraischer Sprache (verbreitet) ist." Setting these references beside Jerome, De viris inlustribus, c. 3, where he says that what he takes to be "Ur-Matthew" (in Hebrew) "has been preserved until the present day in the library at Caesarea which Pamphilus so diligently gathered," we may conclude that the volume about which Jerome here speaks was what Eusebius meant by the "Gospel according to the Hebrews." Now both the De viris passage, and one in Adv. Pelagianos iv, show that Jerome believed this Gospel to be the same work as was described to him as being in the possession of the non-Ebionite Jewish Christians of the Syrian Beroea. Of this he says that it was "in the West Syrian[11] tongue (i.e., Aramaic), but written in Hebrew characters." This work appears to have been unobjectionable in doctrine. Eusebius, for his part, implies, in H. E. iii. 25, that his "Gospel according to the Hebrews," while not canonical, did not deserve to be classed,

[10] H.E. iv. 22 (end).
[11] Chaldaico quidem Syroque sermone.

as a few had recently classed it, among *spuria*. It was thus such a Gospel as might be respected (and even be a favorite, as Eusebius implies) among those Judaeo-Christians whom Hegesippus regarded as orthodox.

Eusebius does not tell us what he found, in the *Memoranda* of Hegesippus, that he could recognize as deriving from the "Gospel according to the Hebrews." One of his Theophany passages,[12] with which he illustrates Matthew 10.34, 35, 36 (I came not to send peace . . . a man's foes shall be they of his own household.) appeals to the explanation found in the "Hebrew Gospel" of the divisions of soul which Christ causes among kinsmen, where the "Hebrew Gospel" reads, "Ich wähle je die Besten mir aus, die mir mein Vater in Himmel gibt." This is a passage that might well be cited in the fifth *Memorandum* in connection with the outbreak of heresy in the virgin Church. And while nothing is essential for our argument about the passages in Hegesippus to which Eusebius refers, other than that they were only derivable from knowledge of the "Hebrew Gospel," it may make the presentation of the argument more simple if we argue as though the above-mentioned passage was one of them. We must then suppose that, in Hegesippus, it was rendered into Greek, either by the author of the Judaeo-Christian history, or by Hegesippus. Of course Eusebius, who discerns no other writer behind Hegesippus, assumes the second alternative. Therefore he concludes (i) that Hegesippus understood Aramaic, and (ii) — which was for him (ἰδίως) the more significant point — that Hegesippus was familiar with Hebrew characters. Therefore, he argues, Hegesippus must have been a Palestinian Jew.

But what is there to rule out the first alternative? The anonymous author of the Judaeo-Christian history, Hellenized as he clearly was, moved or had moved in circles where the "Hebrew Gospel" was familiar. He would therefore know such a saying as that cited above. And, knowing it, he might see its appropriateness for justification of the Jerusalem orthodox church against all heretical Jewish-Christian sects. But writing his history in Greek, he would give the saying in Greek. In that case, Hegesippus can

[12] Gressmann, l.c.

have come by it without either understanding Aramaic or knowing so much as the Hebrew alphabet.

That the first alternative is the more probable may appear from the terms in which Hegesippus begins his story of the martyrdom of James, as cited in H. E. ii. 23. James was entitled "the Just," Hegesippus says, by everyone from the days of Christ's ministry. It is desirable for him to have a title, "seeing that several persons bore the name of James." These sentences are more appropriate if addressed to people whose knowledge of James the Lord's brother was derived from the canonical New Testament, than by a Judaeo-Christian of Jerusalem introducing the subject of James to members of his own community. This would be true, even though that community were very Hellenized and knew books of the New Testament canon. For to those people, as Hegesippus says, James had been known, from Gospel days, as "the Just." All that follows, after these introductory sentences, is extra-canonical, and reveals a viewpoint that, though doctrinally unobjectionable, would be strange to the Great Church. So here again it seems possible to distinguish the part of Hegesippus from that of the earlier writer upon whom he drew. And as soon as we make that distinction, we are left with no reason for thinking Hegesippus to have been either a Jew or a Palestinian.

Finally, it is possible that Hegesippus and Irenaeus were in Rome at the same time. Irenaeus may be presumed then to have been a comparative junior. It is not fanciful, therefore, to think of him as perhaps influenced by the polemical doctrine of Hegesippus. But to say this is to "place" Hegesippus as a late second-century figure in the life of the Great Church, and not as Eusebius placed him, as a subapostolic Judaeo-Christian. No combination of the alternatives is logical.

MILTON AND WOLLEB AGAIN

(Paradise Lost, I, 54–56, 777)

ALTHOUGH the influence of Wolleb's Compendium Theologiae Christianae on Milton's De Doctrina[1] has long been recognized, scholarship has discovered few traces of its impact on Milton's poetry.[2] Particularly interesting, therefore, are two passages in Book I of Paradise Lost which show a close resemblance to two of the "Rules" or "Canones" in Wolleb's chapter "De Gubernatione Angelorum."

1. After his expulsion from heaven, Satan is tormented by the recollection of past felicity and the anticipation of perpetual pain:

> . . . for now the thought
> Both of lost happiness and lasting pain
> Torments him. . . .

In discussing the punishment of the evil angels, Wolleb expresses the same concept:

> Poena ipsorum, partim in memoria amissae
> ac irrecuperabilis felicitatis, partim
> in sempiterno malorum sensu ac cruciatu
> consistit.[3]

Or, as Ross translates this passage:

> Their punishment consisteth partly in the
> memory of their happiness lost irrecoverably,
> partly in the perpetual sense of their misery
> and torments.[4]

[1] Arthur Sewell, A Study in Milton's Christian Doctrine (London, 1939), 35–45; Maurice Kelley, "Milton's Debt to Wolleb's Compendium Theologiae Christianae," PMLA, L (1935), 156–165; T. S. K. Scott-Craig, "Milton's Use of Wolleb and Ames," MLN, LV (1940), 403–407. According to Edward Phillips, the Sunday duties of Milton's pupils included "writing from his own dictation, some part of a tractate which he thought fit to collect from the ablest of divines who had written of that subject: *Amesius*, *Wollebius*, &c. . . ."

[2] See Sewell, 35–45.

[3] Christianae Theologiae Compendium . . . Authore Iohanne Wollebio (Amstelodami, 1633), 55.

[4] John Wollebius, The Abridgement of Christian Divinitie, tr. Alexander Ross, The Third Edition (London, 1660), 64. The first and second editions of this translation had been printed in 1650 and 1656.

Milton's lines are closer to Wolleb than to his own De Doctrina:

> Their knowledge is great, but such as tends
> rather to aggravate than diminish their misery;
> so that they utterly despair of their salvation.[5]

2. At the end of Book I, the devils thronging to Pandaemonium suddenly appear "less than smallest Dwarfs." Milton's comment ("Behold a wonder!") is especially significant, since Wolleb asserts that "Evil Angels can do wonders, but not work miracles," inasmuch as "miracles are works exceeding all power of the creatures."[6]

> Mali Angeli mira faciunt, sed miracula facere
> nequeunt. Miracula enim sunt opera, omnem
> creaturarum potentiam superantia.[7]

In the De Doctrina the closest analogue for this concept is Milton's statement that "God alone is the primary author of miracles, as he only is able to invert that order of things which he has himself appointed."[8] In this case, too, Paradise Lost reveals a closer affinity to Wolleb's treatise than to Milton's own.

Since recent scholarship has demonstrated Wolleb's marked influence on the De Doctrina, it is virtually certain that Milton knew — and knew well — Wolleb's statement of both of these doctrines. Even though they are theological commonplaces which he may have encountered elsewhere,[9] his knowledge of the Compendium is probably responsible, in part, for their re-appearance in Paradise Lost.

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[5] The Works of John Milton, XV (New York, 1933), 110–111. For comparison of this passage with Paradise Lost, see Maurice Kelley, This Great Argument (Princeton, 1941), 138; The Prose Works of John Milton, IV (London, 1883), 219.

[6] Abridgement, 67.

[7] Compendium, 57.

[8] The Works of John Milton, XV, 94–95.

[9] For other discussions of the distinction between diabolical *wonders* and divine *miracles*, see St. Thomas Aquinas, Super Epistolas S. Pauli Lectura, ed. P. Raphael Cai, II (Rome-Turin, 1953), 201; idem, Summa Theologiae, ed. Petrus Caramello (Rome-Turin, 1948), I, Q.110, A.4 and Q.114, A.4; Operum Theologicorum D. Hieronymi Zanchii, III (Geneva, 1619), cols. 191–195; Bartholomaeus Keckermannus, Systema SS. Theologiae (Hanoviae, 1611), 465–466. Cf. the "lying wonders" of 2 Thess. 2:9. The diabolical "wonder" of lines 776–780 is not really a miracle since 1) God is not the author and 2) it is not an effect "out of the usual order of nature." As the demons can take "what shape they choose Dilated or condens't," they are simply displaying a well-known attribute of the angelic nature. See Robert H. West, "The Substance of Milton's Angels," SAMLA Studies in Milton (Gainesville, Fla., 1953), 31–32, 49.

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